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THESIS	  ABSTRACT	  	  Alex	  J.	  Palm	  	  Master	  of	  Science	   	  	  Conflict	  and	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Program	  	  June	  2013	  	  Title:	  Framing	  Peace	  and	  Violence	  in	  Intractable	  Conflict:	  Towards	  an	  Understanding	  of	  Perceptions	  in	  Palestinian	  Universities	  	  	   This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Palestinian	  university	  students	  on	  topics	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel	  and	  armed	  or	  violent	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  By	  relying	  on	  Frame	  Analysis	  literature,	  this	  research	  describes	  how	  respondents	  currently	  frame	  these	  issues	  and	  what	  has	  influenced	  the	  formation	  of	  these	  frames.	  	  Using	  data	  gathered	  over	  a	  period	  of	  three	  months	  through	  a	  survey	  and	  focus	  group	  interviews,	  I	  identify	  four	  dominant	  frames	  of	  peace	  expressed	  by	  respondents.	  	  Data	  were	  collected	  from	  260	  survey	  respondents	  and	  160	  interviewees.	  	  I	  use	  the	  data	  to	  show	  different	  levels	  of	  desire	  for	  peace	  with	  Israel	  and	  support	  for	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  based	  on	  the	  way	  that	  individuals	  defined	  peace.	  	  Respondents	  were	  pessimistic	  about	  peace	  with	  Israel	  and	  supportive	  of	  violent	  engagement	  with	  Israel.	  	  Participants	  who	  defined	  peace	  negatively	  expressed	  these	  sentiments	  more	  frequently.	  	  Interviewees	  expressed	  several	  grievances	  against	  Israeli	  policies	  that	  influence	  their	  opinions	  on	  peace	  and	  violence.	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CHAPTER	  I	  	  
INTRODUCTION	  	   By	  any	  measure,	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  appears	  to	  be	  extremely	  far	  from	  resolution.	  	  With	  the	  continuing	  stall	  of	  negotiating	  processes	  and	  growing	  skepticism	  that	  any	  viable	  two-­‐state	  option	  exists,	  the	  future	  of	  this	  persisting	  conflict	  seems	  as	  bleak	  as	  ever.	  	  If	  and	  when	  there	  is	  to	  be	  a	  negotiation	  process	  that	  produces	  comprehensive	  peace	  in	  this	  region,	  there	  will	  have	  to	  be	  major	  shifts	  in	  the	  way	  that	  that	  all	  parties	  involved,	  including	  intermediating	  parties,	  approach	  the	  process.	  	  For	  a	  real	  peace	  process	  is	  to	  occur,	  all	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict	  will	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  that	  their	  counterparts	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  major	  components	  of	  peacebuilding	  and	  conflict	  resolution.	  	  Among	  these	  significant	  components	  are	  peace	  and	  armed	  or	  violent	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	   In	  what	  follows,	  I	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  way	  that	  peace	  and	  armed,	  or	  violent,	  resistance	  have	  come	  to	  be	  perceived	  by	  Palestinian	  university	  students	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  Because	  these	  concepts	  are	  by	  no	  means	  static	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  influenced	  and	  transformed	  by	  various	  factors,	  a	  framework	  for	  exploring	  the	  current	  circumstances	  and	  potential	  future	  developments	  is	  necessary.	  	   Before	  continuing,	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project	  is	  relatively	  limited.	  	  My	  intention,	  especially	  when	  discussing	  issues	  of	  armed	  or	  unarmed	  resistance,	  is	  purely	  descriptive.	  	  Discussions	  regarding	  whether	  or	  not	  violent	  engagement	  is	  viable	  or	  advisable	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  Further,	  I	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  prescribe	  a	  final	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  Instead,	  I	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  the	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first	  steps	  of	  the	  resolution	  process-­‐	  basic	  understandings	  of	  key	  peacebuilding	  concepts	  and	  conflict	  engagement	  tactics.	  A	  central	  assumption	  that	  I	  begin	  with	  is	  that	  holistic	  peace,	  or	  peace	  that	  necessarily	  involves	  an	  end	  to	  both	  direct,	  overt	  acts	  of	  violence	  and	  hostilities,	  as	  well	  as	  systemic	  or	  structural	  violence	  that	  negatively	  impacts	  livelihood,	  can	  never	  be	  developed	  if	  it	  is	  not	  consented	  to	  by	  a	  significant	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  who	  make	  up	  each	  party.	  1	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  an	  agreement	  has	  not	  gained	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  populous,	  it	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  hold.	  	  Though	  agreements	  and	  handshakes	  of	  the	  leaders	  and	  figureheads	  are	  good	  and	  positive	  steps,	  they	  alone	  will	  not	  guarantee	  that	  just,	  or	  holistic,	  peace	  can	  be	  implemented.	  	  Rather,	  individuals	  living	  in	  conflict	  situations	  must	  understand	  peace	  with	  the	  other	  parties	  as	  positive	  and	  desirable	  (Lederach,	  2005).	  	  Relevant	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  uncover	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  each	  party	  understands	  peace	  with	  the	  other,	  and	  the	  tactics	  that	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  most	  viable,	  whether	  violent	  or	  nonviolent.	  	  Operating	  with	  this	  knowledge	  will	  allow	  the	  mediating	  parties	  to	  design	  peacebuilding	  initiatives	  that	  can	  address	  each	  party’s	  significant	  hesitancies	  and	  concerns	  about	  the	  other	  party	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  relationship.	  The	  goals	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  three-­‐fold.	  	  First,	  using	  the	  data	  collected,	  I	  will	  give	  a	  concise	  description	  of	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinians	  currently	  enrolled	  in	  universities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  understand	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  violence.	  	  Second,	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  use	  a	  few	  different	  terms	  to	  describe	  peace,	  such	  as	  true	  peace,	  holistic	  peace,	  or	  just	  peace.	  	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  communicate	  through	  this	  is	  that	  a	  peace	  agreement	  that	  does	  not	  include	  issues	  of	  freedom,	  security,	  and	  justice	  for	  all	  people	  in	  a	  relationship	  is	  something	  different	  than	  peace,	  regardless	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  direct	  acts	  of	  violence.	  In	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  context,	  it	  may	  be	  too	  early	  to	  talk	  in	  terms	  of	  holistic	  peace.	  	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  less	  direct	  forms	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will	  discuss	  the	  factors	  that	  have	  influenced	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  conceptions	  of	  peace	  and	  violence	  based	  on	  information	  gathered	  in	  group	  interviews.	  	  Finally,	  I	  will	  comment	  on	  factors	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  future	  development	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Palestinians	  frame	  peace	  and	  violence,	  both	  positively	  and	  negatively.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  substantially	  descriptive	  but	  may	  prove	  valuable	  to	  Palestinians,	  Israelis,	  and	  parties	  wishing	  to	  act	  as	  intermediaries.	  	  If	  true,	  just,	  and	  holistic	  peace	  is	  ever	  to	  come	  to	  this	  desperate	  situation,	  new	  and	  broader	  interventions	  will	  be	  necessary.	  	  If	  such	  interventions	  are	  to	  be	  effective,	  they	  must	  operate	  with	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  how	  each	  party	  in	  the	  conflict	  understands	  peace	  with	  the	  other,	  and	  how	  they	  believe	  the	  conflict	  should	  be	  engaged,	  whether	  violently	  or	  nonviolently.	  
Frame	  Analysis	  Frame	  analysis	  is	  a	  method	  of	  understanding	  how	  individuals	  conceptualize	  various	  events,	  issues,	  and	  abstract	  ideas,	  and	  how	  those	  understandings	  eventually	  affect	  actions,	  responses,	  and	  thoughts.	  	  According	  to	  Goffman	  (1986)	  a	  frame	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  means	  of	  interpretation	  that	  is	  employed,	  often	  subconsciously,	  to,	  “locate,	  perceive,	  identify,	  and	  label	  a	  seemingly	  infinite	  number	  of	  concrete	  occurrences.”	  (21).	  	  Similarly,	  Shmueli,	  Elliott,	  and	  Kaufman	  (2006),	  describe	  frames	  as	  lenses	  of	  interpretation	  that	  aid	  people	  in	  understanding	  complex	  issues	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  their	  values,	  beliefs,	  personal	  experiences,	  and	  world	  views.	  	   Though	  it	  is	  rarely	  examined	  explicitly	  in	  the	  conflict	  resolution	  or	  peace	  studies	  literature,	  frame	  analysis	  offers	  a	  valuable	  lens	  to	  those	  engaged	  in	  conflict	  (Schmueli,	  Elliot,	  &	  Kaufman,	  2006).	  	  In	  conflict,	  it	  is	  extremely	  helpful	  for	  all	  parties,	  including	  any	  intermediating	  party,	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  that	  all	  involved	  parties	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are	  framing	  the	  conflict	  at	  hand,	  and	  the	  resolution	  process	  itself.	  	  Parties	  seeking	  to	  resolve	  conflict	  are	  essentially	  seeking	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  all	  existing	  and	  relevant	  frames	  held	  by	  the	  parties.	  	  In	  order	  for	  the	  divergent	  frames	  to	  be	  reconciled,	  different	  peacebuilding	  or	  conflict	  resolution	  interventions	  attempt	  to	  expand,	  shift,	  or	  completely	  transform	  the	  frames	  of	  each	  party.	  	  To	  accomplish	  these	  frame	  shifts,	  new	  or	  more	  accurate	  information	  is	  presented;	  parties	  make	  significant	  gestures,	  or	  highlight	  different	  impactful	  information.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  the	  ways	  that	  two	  parties	  frame,	  or	  understand,	  the	  same	  issue	  are	  incompatible,	  real	  and	  authentic	  inputs	  are	  needed	  to	  reorient	  the	  respective	  understandings.	  	  Conflict	  resolution	  practices	  attempt	  to	  facilitate	  these	  shifts	  based	  on	  factual	  and	  relevant	  inputs.	  	   While	  Goffman’s	  work	  on	  framing	  and	  frame	  analysis	  deals	  largely	  with	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  individuals	  give	  meaning	  to	  events	  or	  issues,	  more	  recent	  work	  in	  frame	  analysis	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  framing	  processes	  of	  groups.	  	  Through	  what	  have	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  collective	  action	  frames	  (Gamson,	  1992;	  Snow	  &	  Benford,	  1988),	  groups	  develop	  common	  meanings	  for	  given	  issues	  and	  events	  that	  guide	  group	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  activity.	  	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  every	  person	  in	  a	  group	  frames	  an	  issue	  exactly	  the	  same	  way.	  	  Instead,	  the	  more	  prevalent	  frames,	  or	  those	  that	  are	  more	  commonly	  implemented,	  emerge	  as	  the	  dominant	  frames.	  	  By	  analyzing	  the	  dominant	  frames	  of	  certain	  issues,	  circumstances,	  or	  events,	  the	  goal	  becomes	  understanding	  why	  a	  group	  acts	  the	  way	  that	  it	  does.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  group	  activity	  and	  movement	  is	  not	  thought	  of	  as	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happening	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  	  Instead,	  group	  action	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  product	  framing	  processes	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  	   Relevant	  to	  the	  work	  at	  hand,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  first	  understand	  the	  existing	  frames	  for	  peace	  and	  violent,	  or	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  methods,	  and	  what	  has	  influenced	  their	  formation.	  	  If	  a	  group	  understands	  peace	  in	  a	  negative	  light,	  they	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  peace	  with	  the	  opposing	  group	  (Curle,	  1971;	  Lederach,	  2005).	  	  Similarly,	  if	  violence,	  or	  armed	  resistance,	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  plausible,	  effective,	  or	  morally	  justified	  means	  of	  engaging	  in	  conflict,	  groups	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  implore	  them	  (Moore	  &	  Jaggers,	  1990;	  Staub,	  2011).	  	  It	  is	  necessary	  then,	  to	  discuss	  what	  impact	  different	  inputs	  have	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  individuals	  frame	  peace	  and	  violence.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  frames	  are	  often	  developed	  because	  of	  information	  that	  is	  either	  partially	  or	  completely	  fabricated	  (Gamson,	  1995).	  	  Therefore,	  frame	  development	  does	  not	  insist	  that	  all	  information	  that	  contributes	  to	  frame	  formation	  be	  absolutely	  factual.	  	   I	  chose	  frame	  analysis	  as	  the	  overarching	  lens	  of	  analysis	  for	  this	  project	  because	  of	  the	  malleable	  nature	  of	  frames.	  	  However,	  framing	  processes,	  as	  discussed	  here,	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  ideologies,	  or	  ideological	  orientations.	  	  Oliver	  and	  Johnson	  (2000)	  make	  a	  very	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  two,	  defining	  an	  ideology	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  theories,	  norms,	  and	  values,	  while	  a	  frame	  is	  an	  interpretive	  lens	  used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  issues.	  	  Westby	  (2002)	  elaborates	  on	  this	  distinction,	  noting	  that	  ideological	  disposition	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  in	  frame	  formation.	  	  Further,	  ideologies	  tend	  to	  be	  much	  more	  static	  and	  difficult	  to	  change,	  while	  framing	  processes	  are	  constantly	  evolving	  (Snow	  &	  Benford,	  1988).	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Therefore,	  it	  is	  essential	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  efforts	  not	  to	  mistake	  framing	  processes	  for	  ideologies.	  	  A	  desire	  for	  violent	  strategies	  in	  conflict	  does	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	  that	  an	  actor	  is	  ideologically	  violent	  or	  aggressive	  (Jacoby	  2000).	  	  While	  this	  may	  be	  a	  possibility,	  it	  also	  may	  be	  that	  the	  actor	  has	  come	  to	  frame	  the	  conflict	  as	  one	  in	  which	  violence	  is	  permissible	  or	  acceptable	  or	  that	  violence	  has	  become	  framed	  as	  a	  viable,	  effective,	  or	  necessary.	  	  
Background	  and	  Context	  	   Before	  any	  thorough	  discussion	  can	  be	  dedicated	  to	  current	  framing	  processes	  among	  West	  Bank	  university	  students,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  background	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  Because	  frame	  analysis	  asserts	  that	  the	  way	  issues	  and	  events	  comes	  to	  be	  understood	  does	  not	  happen	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  current	  situation	  developed	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  frames	  exist	  (Goffman,	  1986).	  	  Obviously,	  as	  volumes	  have	  been	  dedicated	  to	  the	  history	  of	  this	  conflict,	  it	  will	  be	  impossible	  to	  give	  a	  complete	  historical	  discussion	  in	  this	  work.	  	  However,	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  major	  events	  and	  how	  these	  events	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  is	  possible	  and	  essential.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  historical	  overview	  will	  focus	  primarily	  on	  major	  events	  in	  the	  conflict’s	  history	  as	  well	  as	  popular	  conflict	  engagement	  approaches.	  	  This	  approach	  will	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  a	  thorough	  description	  of	  how	  Palestinians	  currently	  frame	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  violent	  engagement.	  	  	  	   Undoubtedly,	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  did	  not	  start	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  on	  almost	  75%	  of	  historic	  Palestine	  in	  1948	  (Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009),	  but	  it	  is	  perhaps	  the	  best	  place	  to	  start	  when	  discussing	  the	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modern	  conflict.	  	  Shortly	  before	  the	  1948	  war,	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  proposed	  a	  plan	  to	  divide	  the	  British	  Mandate	  of	  Palestine	  into	  two	  nations,	  one	  for	  the	  Jewish	  population	  on	  56%	  of	  the	  land	  and	  the	  other	  for	  the	  Arab	  community	  on	  the	  remaining	  43%,	  while	  Jerusalem	  and	  some	  of	  its	  surrounding	  villages	  were	  to	  be	  under	  the	  control	  of	  an	  international	  body	  (Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009;	  UNSCOP,	  1947).	  	  This	  plan	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  Israelis	  and	  subsequently	  rejected	  by	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  Following	  the	  Palestinian	  rejection,	  Israel	  declared	  independence	  on	  the	  land	  allocated	  in	  the	  UN	  plan.	  	  The	  surrounding	  Arab	  communities	  retaliated	  by	  launching	  the	  war.	  	   The	  effects	  of	  the	  war	  were	  enormous.	  	  When	  it	  finally	  ended,	  Israel	  had	  expanded	  its	  borders	  to	  contain	  about	  75%	  of	  Historic	  Palestine	  (Biger,	  2008),	  thus	  creating	  what	  is	  known	  today	  as	  the	  Green	  Line,	  or	  the	  armistice	  line	  of	  1949,	  and	  forming	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  and	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  Control	  of	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  was	  taken	  by	  Egypt,	  while	  Jordan	  occupied	  the	  West	  Bank,	  including	  East	  Jerusalem.	  Both	  sides	  suffered	  thousands	  of	  casualties,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  diaspora	  was	  created.	  	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  over	  900,000	  Arabs	  fled	  their	  homes	  for	  refugee	  camps	  in	  Egypt,	  Jordan	  (Transjordan	  at	  the	  time),	  Syria,	  Lebanon,	  the	  West	  Bank,	  and	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  (United	  Nations	  Relief	  and	  Works	  Agency	  (UNRWA),	  2008).2	  	  These	  refugees	  and	  their	  families	  remain	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  with	  most	  lacking	  an	  option	  for	  citizenship	  anywhere	  despite	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  194	  of	  1948	  that	  calls	  for	  the	  refugees	  of	  the	  1948	  war	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  return	  at	  the	  earliest	  practical	  date	  or	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  statistic	  represents	  the	  number	  of	  Palestinians	  that	  registered	  in	  one	  of	  the	  refugee	  camps	  established	  after	  in	  1948.	  It	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  those	  who	  fled	  their	  homes	  and	  did	  not	  enter	  a	  United	  Nations	  refugee	  camp.	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compensated	  for	  the	  property	  that	  they	  lost	  during	  that	  time	  (United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  (UNGA),	  1948).	  	   In	  1967,	  the	  region	  was	  swept	  up	  in	  another	  massive	  war,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Six	  Days	  War.	  	  With	  the	  Arab	  armies	  from	  Jordan,	  Iraq,	  Egypt,	  Syria,	  and	  Lebanon	  appearing	  to	  prepare	  to	  attack,	  Israel	  all	  but	  wiped	  out	  the	  Egyptian	  air	  fleet	  and	  the	  war	  began	  (Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009).	  	  For	  several	  reasons,	  Israel	  was	  able	  to	  significantly	  push	  back	  the	  Arab	  forces	  in	  just	  six	  days.	  	  The	  result	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  of	  the	  West	  Bank,	  Gaza	  Strip,	  Syria’s	  Golan	  Heights,	  and	  Egypt’s	  Sinai	  Peninsula.	  	  The	  Sinai	  has	  since	  been	  returned	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Israel	  that	  established	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  nations	  and	  a	  demilitarized	  region	  in	  the	  Sinai.	  	  As	  in	  1947,	  all	  sides	  suffered	  thousands	  of	  casualties	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  diaspora	  increased	  significantly.	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  basic	  engagement	  strategies	  of	  these	  two	  wars	  involved	  Palestinian	  dependence	  on	  the	  Arab	  nations	  of	  the	  region	  to	  liberate	  historic	  Palestine	  (Sahliyeh	  &	  Deng,	  2003).	  	  However,	  the	  twenty	  years	  following	  the	  1967	  war	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  new	  strategies	  by	  both	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis.	  	  Within	  a	  few	  years,	  Israel	  began	  developing	  settlements	  in	  the	  areas	  occupied	  in	  the	  war.	  	  Building	  settlements	  quickly	  became	  a	  means	  of	  creating	  facts	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  a	  strategy	  for	  Israel	  to	  slowly	  expand	  into	  areas	  that	  they	  had	  recently	  occupied	  (Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009).	  	  To	  those	  who	  have,	  and	  continue	  to,	  support	  a	  two-­‐state	  option	  to	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict,	  settlements	  and	  the	  strategic	  creeping	  policies	  of	  Israel	  through	  settlement	  construction	  have	  been	  a	  major	  hindrance.	  	  The	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Palestinian	  population	  instantly	  met	  Israeli	  settlements	  with	  resistance	  and	  they	  have	  continuously	  been	  sources	  and	  sites	  of	  violence	  since	  their	  building	  began.	  	   During	  this	  time,	  Palestinians	  began	  to	  organize	  and	  develop	  new	  resistance	  strategies	  that	  were	  not	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  Most	  notably,	  during	  this	  time	  the	  Palestinian	  Liberation	  Organization	  (PLO),	  led	  by	  Yasser	  Arafat,	  gained	  popularity	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  occupied	  territories	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  diaspora.	  	  The	  PLO,	  along	  with	  organizations	  like	  the	  Popular	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine,	  began	  to	  organize	  popular	  resistance	  initiatives	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  armed	  resistance	  was	  the	  only	  means	  by	  which	  Palestinians	  could	  liberate	  themselves	  and	  attain	  their	  national	  aspirations.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  nonviolent	  tactics	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  strategy	  (Abu-­‐Nimer,	  2003),	  but	  that	  the	  dominant	  understanding	  was	  that	  violent	  engagement	  provided	  the	  only	  viable	  solution	  to	  the	  Palestinians.	  	   Another	  idea	  that	  gained	  popularity	  at	  times,	  especially	  with	  the	  Israeli	  left,	  was	  the	  notion	  that	  land	  could	  be	  swapped	  for	  peace	  (Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009;	  Dajani,	  2005).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  proposal	  was	  that,	  if	  Palestinians	  were	  given	  land	  and	  a	  state	  to	  rule,	  peaceful	  relations	  with	  the	  Israeli	  state	  could	  be	  achieved.	  	  However,	  this	  notion	  was	  challenged	  strongly	  by	  members	  of	  each	  party.	  	  More	  hawkish	  Israelis	  opposed	  the	  idea	  primarily	  because	  they	  wished	  to	  expand	  the	  Jewish	  state	  farther	  into	  Historic	  Palestine,	  or	  because	  they	  believed	  that	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  Israeli	  security.	  	  Similarly,	  many	  Palestinians	  objected	  to	  the	  thought	  of	  land	  for	  peace	  because	  they	  were	  fundamentally	  opposed	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Israeli	  state	  in	  Historic	  Palestine.	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   In	  December	  1987,	  with	  settlement	  activity	  increasing,	  especially	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip,	  the	  Palestinians	  collectively	  launched	  the	  first	  Intifada,	  or	  uprising.	  	  The	  first	  Intifada,	  which	  lasted	  about	  six	  years,	  was	  characterized	  by	  mass	  strikes,	  work	  stoppages,	  boycotts	  of	  Israeli	  products,	  demonstrations,	  and	  stone	  throwing	  (Abu-­‐Nimer	  &	  Groves,	  2003).3	  	  These	  movements	  were	  met	  with	  harsh	  Israeli	  retaliation,	  including	  road	  closures,	  arrests,	  and	  heavy	  military	  interventions.	  	  A	  vital	  turning	  point	  in	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  relations	  was	  Arafat’s	  speech	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  1988	  in	  which	  he,	  and	  the	  PLO,	  recognized	  Israel’s	  sovereignty,	  accepted	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  1947	  armistice	  lines,	  or	  the	  Green	  Line,	  and	  renounced	  violent	  resistance	  (Bickerton	  &	  Kalusner,	  2009).	  	  In	  return,	  the	  United	  States,	  followed	  soon	  by	  Israel,	  began	  to	  engage	  directly	  with	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO.	  	   As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  new	  strategies	  of	  direct	  engagement,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  PLO	  and	  the	  Israeli	  government	  agreed	  to	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  in	  1993.	  	  Through	  the	  Oslo	  Accords,	  Israel	  recognized	  the	  PLO,	  under	  Arafat’s	  leadership,	  as	  the	  sole	  representative	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  people,	  and	  the	  PLO	  officially	  recognized	  Israel’s	  right	  to	  exist.	  	  The	  Oslo	  process	  also	  granted	  Palestinians	  sovereignty	  over	  parts	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip,	  known	  as	  Area	  A,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  (PA)	  as	  the	  governing	  body.	  	  Area	  B	  was	  designated	  as	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Territories	  where	  the	  PA	  was	  granted	  administrative	  power	  but	  Israel	  maintained	  security	  control,	  and	  Area	  C	  remained	  under	  full	  Israeli	  control.	  	  Area	  C	  was	  the	  largest	  of	  these	  zones	  and	  has	  been	  the	  location	  for	  most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  very	  good	  description	  of	  the	  first	  Intifada	  and	  its	  nonviolent	  and	  elements,	  See	  Abu-­‐Nimer	  and	  Groves	  in	  Abu-­‐Nimer	  (2003).	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Israel	  settlement	  activity.	  	  Further,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  important,	  Oslo	  laid	  out	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  future	  of	  negotiations.	  	  It	  was	  agreed	  that	  negotiations	  would	  reserve	  final	  
status	  issues	  as	  the	  last	  criteria	  to	  be	  resolved.	  	  The	  final	  status	  issues	  were	  identified	  as	  borders	  of	  Israel	  and	  Palestine,	  the	  future	  of	  existing	  settlements	  the	  status	  of	  Jerusalem,	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  refugees.	  	  Since	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  agreement,	  the	  Oslo	  process	  and	  its	  positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  have	  been	  extensively	  explored	  and	  debated.	  	  While	  these	  discussions	  are	  necessary,	  they	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  What	  is	  important	  for	  the	  purposes	  here	  is	  that	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  were	  signed	  and	  that	  they	  did	  not	  result	  a	  Palestinian	  state.	  	   Within	  the	  Palestinian	  territories,	  organizations	  opposed	  to	  the	  negotiation	  process	  with	  Israel	  became	  more	  prominent.	  	  Most	  notably	  and	  influential	  among	  these	  is	  HAMAS	  or	  the	  Islamic	  Resistance	  Movement.	  	  These	  organizations,	  similar	  to	  earlier	  notions	  explicitly	  held	  by	  the	  PLO,	  believed	  that	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  would	  only	  come	  through	  a	  commitment	  to	  armed	  resistance	  (Hroub,	  2006;	  Milton-­‐Edwards	  &	  Farrell,	  2010).	  	  To	  these	  organizations,	  agreements	  became	  seen	  as	  impossible	  concessions	  because	  they	  necessarily	  demanded	  that	  Palestinians	  compromise	  on	  their	  rights.	  	  	   The	  emergence	  of	  HAMAS	  is	  important	  because	  the	  movement	  became	  popular	  around	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  PLO,	  primarily	  represented	  by	  Arafat’s	  party	  Fatah,	  began	  to	  embrace	  negotiation	  and	  engagement	  with	  their	  Israeli	  counterparts.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  organizations	  represents	  the	  dialectal	  relationship	  of	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies	  throughout	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  conflict’s	  history.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  divergence	  between	  groups	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supporting	  collaborative	  initiatives	  and	  those	  demanding	  armed	  resistance	  undoubtedly	  existed	  before	  the	  Oslo	  Accords.	  	  However,	  the	  difference	  was	  emphasized	  and	  made	  institutionally	  clear	  in	  the	  differing	  strategies	  of	  the	  organizations.4	  	   For	  several	  reasons,	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  did	  not	  result	  in	  lasting	  peace	  between	  Israel	  and	  Palestine.	  	  In	  the	  period	  of	  time	  following	  the	  agreements,	  several	  attempts	  were	  made	  by	  the	  Palestinians,	  Israelis,	  and	  international	  actors	  concerned	  with	  regional	  peace	  to	  complete	  a	  final	  negotiated	  settlement.	  	  Proposal	  upon	  proposal	  has	  been	  produced	  and	  all	  have	  failed.	  	  In	  2000,	  following	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  Ariel	  Sharon’s	  controversial	  entrance	  to	  the	  Temple	  Mount	  complex	  and	  the	  Dome	  of	  the	  Rock	  Mosque,	  the	  Palestinians	  launched	  the	  second	  Intifada	  or	  the	  Al	  Aqsa	  Intifada.	  	  Sharon’s	  entrance	  to	  the	  Mosque,	  which	  is	  considered	  the	  third	  holiest	  site	  in	  Islam,	  came	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Palestinian	  frustrations	  were	  especially	  high	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  on	  the	  conflict.	  	  The	  Intifada	  was	  characterized	  by	  violence,	  persistent	  armed	  struggle,	  heavy	  Israeli	  crackdowns	  throughout	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza,	  and	  suicide	  attacks	  by	  Palestinians	  in	  Israel	  (Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009).	  	  Where	  most	  of	  the	  conflict	  engagement	  in	  the	  first	  Intifada	  was	  focused	  on	  protest	  and	  demonstration,	  the	  second	  Intifada	  relied	  heavily	  on	  fighting.	  	  Throughout	  this	  time	  of	  fighting,	  scores	  of	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  lost	  their	  lives.	  	   In	  2005,	  under	  Sharon,	  Israel	  unilaterally	  withdrew	  from	  the	  entire	  Gaza	  Strip,	  which	  many	  Palestinians	  received	  as	  major	  victory	  for	  their	  resistance	  fighters	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  an	  over-­‐simplified	  description	  of	  the	  divergence	  of	  conflict	  engagement	  methods.	  For	  example,	  there	  are	  undoubtedly	  several	  Hamas	  supporters	  who	  support	  negotiation	  processes	  and	  PLO	  supporters	  that	  push	  for	  armed	  resistance.	  	  It	  is	  the	  leadership	  of	  each	  and	  their	  discourse	  related	  to	  conflict	  engagement	  that	  is	  being	  considered	  in	  this	  discussion.	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(Bickerton	  &	  Klausner,	  2009).	  	  Another	  effect	  of	  the	  Intifada	  was	  increased	  Palestinian	  support	  for	  Hamas,	  which	  was	  only	  helped	  by	  growing	  distrust	  in	  the	  governing	  Fatah	  party.	  	  This	  growing	  support	  was	  most	  evidenced	  in	  the	  massive	  parliamentary	  victory	  for	  Hamas	  in	  the	  2006	  elections.	  	  This	  was	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  Palestinians	  were	  putting	  more	  and	  more	  of	  their	  trust	  in	  Hamas	  and	  its	  stance	  on	  armed	  resistance	  (Gunning,	  2010).	  	  Naturally,	  there	  are	  other	  things	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  Hamas	  victory,	  including	  corruption	  in	  the	  other	  parties	  and	  the	  Islamic	  core	  of	  the	  Hamas	  party.	  	  The	  Hamas	  victory	  divided	  the	  Palestinian	  people,	  leading	  to	  factional	  violence	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  territories	  and	  resulting	  in	  a	  split	  between	  the	  Hamas	  controlled	  Gaza	  Strip	  and	  the	  Fatah	  controlled	  West	  Bank	  (Hroub,	  2006).	  	   The	  time	  period	  since	  2006	  has	  included	  more	  failed	  negotiations,	  increased	  settlement	  activity	  by	  Israel	  in	  the	  West	  Bank,	  missiles	  fired	  on	  Israel	  from	  Gaza,	  air	  raids	  on	  Gaza	  from	  Israel,	  and	  an	  entire	  blockade	  of	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  that	  has	  rendered	  the	  people	  in	  Gaza	  with	  few	  resources	  and	  few	  means	  to	  rebuild	  the	  territory.	  	  Recently,	  in	  2012,	  after	  a	  series	  of	  Israeli	  air	  raids	  in	  Gaza,	  Hamas	  fired	  the	  first	  missiles	  from	  Gaza	  that	  successfully	  reached	  the	  Tel	  Aviv	  and	  Jerusalem	  regions,	  hinting	  that	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  further	  escalate	  the	  fighting.	  	  The	  Gazan	  factions	  and	  Israel	  are	  maintaining	  a	  very	  fragile	  ceasefire.	  	   As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  point	  of	  this	  historical	  overview	  is	  to	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  Palestinian	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  Palestinians	  have	  approached	  the	  conflict	  in	  several	  different	  ways.	  	  After	  losing	  two	  wars,	  which	  they	  fought	  alongside	  Arab	  armies,	  they	  turned	  to	  mass	  protests	  and	  demonstrations	  in	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the	  first	  Intifada,	  fighting	  and	  aggressive	  attacks	  in	  the	  Second	  Intifada,	  and	  throughout	  the	  past	  few	  years	  rocket	  fire	  has	  become	  more	  popular.	  	  According	  to	  Sahliyeh	  and	  Deng	  (2003),	  Palestinian	  support	  for	  resistance	  and	  engagement	  methods	  has	  varied	  greatly	  over	  time.	  	  Their	  research	  shows	  a	  gradual	  downward	  trend	  in	  the	  prospects	  for	  peace	  and	  an	  upward	  trend	  in	  the	  desire	  for,	  or	  approval	  of,	  armed	  engagement	  strategies	  since	  1995,	  shortly	  after	  the	  Oslo	  accords	  were	  signed.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  since	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  more	  Palestinians	  have	  become	  pessimistic	  about	  peace	  with	  Israel	  while	  more	  have	  come	  to	  support	  violence,	  especially	  after	  failed	  negotiation	  attempts,	  the	  release	  of	  new	  Israeli	  settlement	  construction,	  and	  actions	  that	  infringe	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  economy.	  	  Today,	  the	  occupation	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Territories	  persists	  and	  hopes	  that	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  are	  dwindling	  by	  even	  the	  most	  optimistic	  of	  all	  involved	  parties.	  	  	  	   	  This	  is	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  research	  for	  this	  project	  was	  conducted.	  	  The	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  not,	  by	  any	  calculation,	  fertile	  for	  peace.	  	  In	  this	  project,	  I	  seek	  to	  begin	  to	  understand	  how	  young	  Palestinians	  perceive	  peace	  with	  their	  Israeli	  counterparts,	  and	  which	  conflict	  engagement	  methods	  they	  currently	  support.	  	  Understanding	  these	  essential	  factors	  can	  guide	  those	  involved	  in	  this	  conflict	  in	  designing	  new	  initiatives	  that	  may	  allow	  for	  a	  true	  peace	  process.	  
Project	  Overview	  	   As	  stated	  earlier,	  I	  seek	  in	  this	  thesis	  to	  explain	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinians	  currently	  enrolled	  in	  universities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  frame	  peace	  and	  violent,	  or	  armed,	  resistance.	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  provided	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict,	  examined	  the	  historical-­‐political	  context	  in	  which	  the	  data	  was	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collected,	  and	  introduced	  frame	  analysis	  and	  collective	  action	  frames.	  	  In	  Chapter	  II,	  I	  will	  give	  an	  in-­‐depth	  review	  frame	  analysis	  literature	  by	  providing	  the	  background	  of	  frame	  analysis	  and	  its	  common	  uses,	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  about	  frame	  shifts	  and	  their	  causes.	  	  Further,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  parties	  to	  intractable	  conflict	  come	  to	  support	  or	  oppose	  peacebuilding	  or	  armed	  activities	  through	  a	  frame	  analysis	  and	  frame	  development	  lens.	  	  In	  Chapter	  III,	  I	  will	  further	  describe	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  gather	  the	  data	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  design	  an	  implementation	  for	  the	  survey	  distribution	  and	  group	  interview	  processes.	  	  In	  Chapter	  IV,	  I	  will	  report	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  both	  the	  surveys	  and	  the	  group	  interviews.	  	  Using	  this	  data,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  about	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  participants	  frame	  issues	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel	  and	  how	  they	  frame	  violent	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	  In	  Chapter	  V,	  I	  will	  offer	  some	  conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  data	  and	  discuss	  their	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  of	  this	  conflict.	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CHAPTER	  II	  	  
LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
	  
Overview	  of	  Frame	  Analysis	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  a	  frame	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  way	  that	  people	  organize	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  inputs	  (Goffman,	  1986).	  	  According	  to	  Goffman	  (1986),	  whose	  work	  provides	  some	  of	  the	  earliest	  discussion	  of	  framing	  and	  frame	  analysis,	  frames	  are	  used	  to,	  “locate,	  perceive,	  identify,	  and	  label”	  (p.	  21)	  all	  events,	  ideas,	  and	  occurrences	  encountered.	  	  Frames	  serve	  as	  a	  system	  for	  organizing	  experience	  and	  guiding	  action	  (Benford	  &	  Snow	  2000;	  Shmueli,	  Elliot,	  &	  Kaufman	  2006).	  	  They	  aid	  in	  the	  process	  of	  identifying	  problems	  and	  their	  causes,	  making	  morally	  based	  judgments,	  and	  prescribing	  potential	  remedies	  (Gamson	  1992;	  Entman	  1993).	  	  Gamson	  (1989)	  suggests	  that	  a	  frame	  is	  a	  central	  method	  of	  organization	  and	  that	  facts	  become	  meaningful	  by	  being	  interpreted	  through,	  and	  embedded	  in,	  a	  frame.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  variety	  of	  people	  can	  interpret	  the	  same	  data	  is	  explained	  by	  differences	  in	  frames.	  Though	  Goffman’s	  (1986)	  original	  exploration	  of	  frames	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  way	  that	  individuals	  form	  and	  utilize	  frames,	  much	  of	  the	  work	  on	  frame	  analysis	  has	  been	  carried	  to	  the	  collective	  level.	  	  Snow	  and	  Benford	  (1992)	  describe	  collective	  actions	  frames	  as	  sets	  of	  beliefs	  and	  meanings	  that	  influence	  group	  activity.	  	  Collective	  action	  frames	  cannot	  be	  simply	  understood	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  individual	  frames	  of	  a	  group’s	  members,	  and	  all	  individuals	  are	  not	  thought	  to	  frame	  issues	  in	  the	  same	  manner.	  	  Instead,	  frames	  are	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  way	  that	  a	  group	  of	  people	  develops	  shared	  meaning	  (Gamson	  1992).	  	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	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individuals	  use	  frames	  to	  understand	  different	  issues,	  groups	  implement	  collective	  frames	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  things	  that	  affect	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  (Benford	  &	  Snow	  2000).	  	  Naturally,	  not	  all	  members	  of	  the	  group	  will	  frame	  everything	  in	  the	  same	  manner.	  	  Through	  several	  processes,	  the	  more	  pervasive	  frames	  will	  be	  emphasized.	  Groups	  rarely	  share	  one	  exclusive	  frame	  for	  any	  given	  issue	  (Gamson,	  1995;	  Klandermans,	  1994;	  Snow	  and	  Benford,	  1992),	  but	  different	  frames	  gain	  or	  lose	  support	  within	  a	  group	  through	  what	  Gamson	  (1985)	  defines	  as	  oppositional	  
framing	  processes.	  	  When	  group	  members	  receive	  new	  information,	  whether	  through	  the	  media,	  a	  social	  leader,	  or	  through	  personal	  experience,	  frames	  continue	  to	  be	  molded	  and	  different	  frames	  may	  gain	  or	  lose	  permanence	  within	  the	  group	  (Gamson,	  1992).	  	  The	  frames	  that	  are	  the	  most	  dominant	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  primary,	  or	  dominant,	  frames	  (Snow	  &	  Benford,	  1988).	  	  Oppositional	  framing	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  overt	  competition	  between	  group	  members	  that	  frame	  issues	  a	  certain	  way.	  	  Instead	  the	  various	  frames	  that	  exist	  amongst	  group	  members	  are	  in	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  and	  are	  constantly	  shifting	  and	  changing	  in	  response	  to	  new	  inputs	  (Gamson,	  1992;	  Snow	  &	  Benford,	  1988).	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  of	  the	  significant	  role	  that	  frames	  play	  in	  informing	  group	  movement.	  	  Because	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  group	  frames	  key	  issues	  helps	  to	  guide	  its	  collective	  behavior,	  as	  frames	  gain	  permanence	  within	  a	  group,	  group	  activity	  changes	  due	  to	  the	  new	  filter	  that	  it	  perceives	  issues	  and	  events	  through.	  	   Snow	  and	  Benford	  (1988)	  identify	  three	  primary	  tasks	  that	  collective	  actions	  frames	  fulfill:	  diagnostic,	  prognostic,	  and	  motivational.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  functions	  serves	  a	  different	  purpose	  in	  the	  process	  that	  groups	  use	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  issues	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and	  events.	  	  The	  diagnostic	  characteristic	  of	  group	  framing	  processes	  provides	  a	  descriptive	  lens	  for	  groups.	  	  Through	  this	  process,	  groups	  identify	  problems	  and	  attribute	  blame.	  	  Prognostic	  framing	  processes	  determine	  a	  group’s	  response	  to	  an	  event	  and	  where	  the	  response	  should	  be	  directed.	  Motivational	  framing	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  groups	  are	  moved	  to	  implement	  the	  responses	  produced	  through	  prognostic	  framing	  processes.	  	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  processes	  do	  not	  necessarily	  occur	  in	  order,	  and	  one	  framing	  process	  does	  not	  necessitate	  the	  others.	  	  Gamson	  (1985),	  in	  his	  description	  of	  injustice	  frames,	  discusses	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  groups	  that	  have	  clearly	  adopted	  an	  injustice	  frame	  in	  the	  diagnostic	  sense,	  and	  have	  developed	  a	  strong	  frame	  on	  their	  responses,	  but	  they	  have	  never	  developed	  the	  motivational	  frame	  required	  to	  spur	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Further,	  Snow	  et	  al	  (1986),	  show	  that	  grievances	  alone	  are	  rarely	  enough	  to	  spur	  a	  group	  to	  action.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  identification	  of	  an	  undesirable	  aspect	  of	  society	  by	  a	  group	  is	  rarely	  enough	  to	  cause	  a	  social	  movement.	   	  	  	   It	  is	  essential	  that	  framing	  processes	  do	  not	  become	  confused	  with	  individual	  or	  group	  ideologies	  (Oliver	  &	  Johnson,	  2005;	  Snow	  &	  Benford	  2005;	  Westby,	  2002).	  	  Oliver	  and	  Johnson	  (2000)	  draw	  a	  very	  clear	  distinction	  between	  frames	  and	  ideologies,	  describing	  ideology	  as	  the	  totality	  of	  theories,	  norms,	  and	  values	  and	  frames	  as	  simply	  an	  interpretive	  lens.	  	  Frames,	  however,	  cannot	  be	  isolated	  from	  ideology,	  but	  are	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  and	  derived	  from	  it	  (Snow	  and	  Benford,	  2005;	  Westby,	  2002).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  way	  that	  issues	  are	  framed	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  ideology	  of	  an	  individual,	  and	  the	  operating	  ideology	  of	  an	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individual	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  frames	  used	  to	  interpret	  any	  given	  issue.	  	  Where	  ideologies	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  concrete,	  and	  thus	  difficult	  to	  change,	  frames	  are	  fluid	  and	  constantly	  being	  transformed	  (Gamson,	  1989).	  	   Snow	  et	  al	  (1986),	  identifies	  four	  primary	  ways	  in	  which	  frames	  change:	  
bridging,	  amplification,	  extension,	  and	  transformation.	  	  In	  frame	  bridging,	  individuals	  or	  groups	  change	  the	  way	  that	  they	  frame	  an	  issue	  or	  event	  based	  on	  something	  that	  is	  not	  necessarily	  connected	  to	  the	  issue	  or	  event	  at	  hand.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  bridging	  serves	  as	  a	  networking	  tool	  between	  groups	  with	  similar	  dispositions,	  but	  that	  have	  yet	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  frame.	  	  Frame	  amplification	  occurs	  when	  a	  desirable	  value	  or	  belief	  that	  members	  of	  a	  group	  hold	  is	  highlighted	  or	  emphasized	  to	  make	  the	  frame	  more	  appealing	  or	  to	  hide	  a	  less	  desirable	  value	  or	  belief.	  	  Frame	  extension	  is	  the	  process	  of	  including	  a	  new	  element	  to	  a	  frame	  that	  was	  previously	  absent.	  	  Finally,	  frame	  transformation	  is	  a	  process	  in	  which	  the	  way	  that	  a	  group	  frames	  an	  issue	  or	  event	  completely	  changes	  into	  an	  entirely	  different	  frame	  of	  the	  same	  issue	  or	  event.	  	   As	  explained	  earlier,	  frames	  are	  constantly	  changing	  based	  on	  several	  different	  inputs.	  	  As	  individuals	  receive	  new	  information,	  the	  way	  that	  they	  frame	  various	  issues	  either	  changes	  or	  is	  affirmed.	  	  Gamson	  (1989)	  identifies	  the	  media,	  popular	  wisdom,	  and	  common	  experience	  as	  the	  primary	  influences	  on	  frame	  formation.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  these	  are	  the	  three	  main	  inputs	  to	  which	  individuals	  are	  regularly	  exposed,	  and	  thus	  they	  shape	  the	  way	  that	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  information	  frames	  key	  issues.	  	  As	  new	  information	  is	  received	  by	  the	  individual	  one	  of	  the	  frame	  shifts	  listed	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraphs	  is	  enacted.	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Frame	  Analysis	  in	  Conflict	  Resolution	  	   While	  frame	  analysis	  and	  framing	  theories	  have	  typically	  been	  utilized	  in	  social	  psychology	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  and	  for	  studying	  social	  movement	  and	  mobilization	  at	  the	  collective	  level,	  they	  have	  a	  very	  important	  role	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  practices.	  Conflict	  is	  essentially	  the	  perception	  of	  incompatible	  goals,	  interests	  (Fisher	  &	  Ury,	  1991),	  physical	  and	  psychological	  needs	  (Burton	  1990),	  values,	  or	  beliefs	  between	  two	  or	  more	  parties	  (Deutsch	  1973).	  	  More	  broadly,	  Lederach	  (1988)	  argues	  that	  conflict	  arises	  when	  one	  party’s	  understanding	  of	  a	  situation,	  issue,	  or	  event	  comes	  into	  direct	  contact	  with	  another	  party	  that	  views	  the	  same	  situation,	  issue,	  or	  event	  differently.	  	  Augsburger	  (1992)	  adds	  that	  conflict	  emerges	  between	  parties	  that	  assume	  that	  they	  live	  in	  one	  social	  reality,	  and	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  conflict	  is	  related	  to	  the	  importance	  allotted	  to	  it	  by	  any	  of	  the	  parties	  involved.	  	  	   Intractable	  conflicts,	  or	  those	  that	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  resolved	  through	  peaceful	  negotiation	  practices	  (Kriesberg	  1993),	  pose	  additional	  and	  substantial	  challenges	  for	  scholars	  and	  practitioners.	  	  Rouhana	  and	  Bar-­‐Tal	  (1998)	  describe	  intractable	  conflicts	  as	  identifiable	  by	  their	  protractedness,	  centrality,	  violent	  nature,	  and	  perception	  of	  irreconcilability.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  intractable	  conflicts	  are	  far-­‐reaching	  and	  deeply	  rooted	  conflicts	  that	  touch	  every	  part	  of	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  people	  involved,	  often	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  violence,	  and	  leave	  parties	  feeling	  that	  the	  conflict	  is	  irreconcilable.	  	  Mayer	  (2009)	  adds	  that	  intractable	  conflicts	  are	  structurally	  embedded,	  systemic	  and	  complex,	  rooted	  in	  distrust	  and	  power	  imbalances,	  and	  involve	  identity	  and	  value-­‐based	  issues.	  	  Participants	  in	  these	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conflicts	  are	  shown	  to	  develop	  strong	  societal	  beliefs	  that	  boost	  their	  respective	  narrative	  and	  position	  as	  just	  and	  right,	  and	  the	  others’	  as	  wrong	  and	  evil	  (Rouhana	  &	  Bar-­‐Tal,	  1998).	  	  	  Shmueli,	  Elliot,	  &	  Kaufman	  (2006),	  with	  these	  conceptions	  of	  conflict	  in	  mind,	  observe	  that	  a	  large	  part	  of	  conflict,	  and	  conflict	  escalation,	  results	  from	  divergent	  or	  incompatible	  frames.	  	  In	  intractable	  conflict,	  they	  argue	  that,	  “frame	  differences	  often	  exacerbate	  communication	  difficulties,	  polarize	  parties,	  and	  escalate	  strife”	  	  (p.	  209).	  	  They	  continue,	  “Polarization	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  parties’	  frames	  feeding	  stakeholders’	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  in	  the	  right	  and	  should	  not	  compromise”	  (p.	  209).	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  all	  parties	  to	  understand	  how	  all	  other	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict,	  including	  the	  intervening	  or	  mediating	  parties,	  frame	  the	  major	  issues,	  events,	  and	  situations	  relevant	  to	  the	  conflict.	  Conflict	  resolution	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  often	  refer	  to	  reframing	  when	  discussing	  resolution	  practices.	  	  Essentially,	  reframing	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  a	  participant	  adopts	  a	  new	  outlook	  on	  an	  element	  of	  the	  given	  conflict,	  or	  the	  conflict	  itself.	  	  Conflict	  interveners	  seek	  to	  design	  processes	  that	  will	  provide	  accurate	  and	  helpful	  information	  that	  will	  encourage	  parties	  to	  adjust	  the	  way	  that	  they	  frame	  relevant	  issues	  or	  events	  in	  a	  more	  constructive	  manner.	  	  Lederach	  (1998)	  describes	  reframing	  as	  the	  processes	  of	  relocating	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  given	  issue	  based	  on	  new	  information.	  Continuing	  his	  description	  of	  conflict,	  as	  described	  above,	  Augsburger	  (1992),	  discusses	  resolution	  as	  the	  process	  of	  reframing	  one’s	  view	  of	  social	  reality	  based	  on	  a	  more	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  at	  hand.	  	  By	  understanding	  the	  existing	  frames	  of	  each	  of	  the	  conflicting	  parties,	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conflict	  interveners	  can	  design	  engagement	  systems	  that	  will	  address	  the	  divergence	  in	  existing	  frames	  held	  by	  all	  parties	  to	  a	  given	  conflict.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  frames	  are	  constantly	  being	  molded	  as	  the	  individual	  or	  group	  receives	  new	  inputs,	  most	  notably	  from	  the	  media,	  popular	  wisdom,	  and	  recent	  events	  (Gamson	  1992).	  	  According	  to	  Curle	  (1971)	  conflict	  resolution,	  when	  the	  focus	  is	  a	  more	  just,	  equal,	  and	  peaceful	  relationship	  between	  two	  parties	  begins	  with	  the	  education	  of	  the	  parties	  while	  the	  conflict	  remains	  latent.	  	  Education,	  according	  to	  Curle,	  must	  be	  based	  on	  facts	  and	  truth	  in	  order	  for	  the	  resolution	  process	  to	  advance	  towards	  a	  more	  peaceful	  situation.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  framing	  and	  reframing,	  this	  suggests	  that	  the	  inputs	  that	  continue	  to	  shape	  the	  way	  that	  conflicting	  parties	  frame	  the	  issues	  central	  to	  the	  conflict	  should	  always	  be	  based	  on	  truthful	  and	  accurate	  information.	  	  When	  the	  goals	  of	  educational	  efforts	  become	  based	  on	  something	  other	  than	  a	  more	  just	  and	  peaceful	  reality,	  the	  information	  that	  is	  influencing	  the	  framing	  processes	  can	  become	  a	  tool	  to	  manipulate	  the	  party,	  which	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  period	  of	  unsustainable	  peace	  (Lederach,	  1998).	  	  When	  a	  party	  is	  made	  aware	  of	  fallacies	  in	  the	  information	  that	  has	  shaped	  its	  understanding	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  result	  will	  undoubtedly	  be	  further	  mistrust	  and	  intractability	  (Mayer,	  2009;	  Rouhana	  &	  Bar-­‐Tal,	  1998).	  	   As	  intractable	  conflicts	  persist	  and	  parties	  become	  further	  entrenched	  in	  their	  understandings	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  all	  of	  its	  intricacies,	  different	  issues	  central	  to	  the	  conflict	  begin	  to	  be	  framed	  as	  non-­‐negotiable.	  	  Atran	  and	  Axelrod	  (2008)	  discuss	  the	  development	  of	  sacred	  values	  in	  conflicts	  that	  appear	  intractable.	  	  They	  describe	  sacred	  values	  as	  those	  that	  groups	  hold	  as	  central	  to	  their	  regular	  activity.	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While	  sacred	  values	  are	  often	  tied	  to	  religious	  beliefs,	  it	  is	  not	  essential	  to	  their	  formation.	  	  Values	  become	  sacred	  because	  of	  the	  strong	  moral	  attachment	  that	  they	  hold	  for	  groups	  (Fiske	  &	  Tetlock’	  1997),	  and	  infringements	  on	  them	  are	  interpreted	  as	  especially	  severe	  (Tetlock,	  et	  al	  2000).	  	  	  In	  conflict	  resolution	  processes,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  all	  involved	  parties	  will	  have	  to	  make	  some	  very	  sizeable	  concessions	  that	  may	  be	  quite	  painful.	  	  If	  a	  member	  of	  a	  party	  feels	  that	  one	  of	  the	  concessions	  that	  the	  party	  may	  be	  asked	  to	  make	  compromises	  a	  value	  that	  is	  considered	  sacred,	  it	  will	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  these	  values	  (Atran	  &	  Axelrod’	  2008;	  Fiske	  &	  Tetlock,	  1997).	  	  A	  person	  that	  perceives	  an	  action	  to	  be	  a	  threat	  or	  attack	  on	  their	  respective	  sacred	  values	  will	  likely	  respond	  with	  feelings	  of	  moral	  outrage,	  and	  moral	  cleansing	  (Tetlock,	  et	  al,	  2000).	  	  Moral	  outrage	  is	  identifiable	  by	  harsh	  attributions	  against	  the	  offender,	  anger	  and	  contempt	  towards	  offender,	  and	  desire	  for	  strong	  retaliation.	  	  Moral	  cleansing	  refers	  to	  a	  process	  of	  strengthening	  ties	  to	  the	  value	  that	  the	  individual	  believes	  to	  have	  been	  challenged.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  an	  individual	  believes	  that	  her	  or	  his	  sacred	  values	  are	  being	  threatened,	  he	  or	  she	  will	  likely	  become	  more	  intensely	  attached	  to	  the	  issue	  at	  stake	  and	  the	  conflict	  will	  escalate.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  responses	  will	  only	  serve	  to	  further	  entrench	  the	  parties	  and	  increase	  the	  intractability	  of	  the	  conflict	  (Atran	  &	  Axelrod,	  2008;	  Augsburger,	  1992).	  Several	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  have	  sought	  to	  prescribe	  tools	  and	  methods	  for	  resolving	  the	  moral	  and	  identity-­‐based	  aspects	  inherent	  to	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  intractable	  conflicts.	  	  Fisher	  and	  Uri	  (1991)	  suggest	  that	  conflict	  is	  best	  resolved	  if	  the	  parties	  refer	  exclusively	  to	  objective	  material	  in	  negotiations.	  	  In	  their	  view,	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parties	  who	  are	  committed	  to	  jointly	  uncovering	  objective	  realities	  and	  utilizing	  them	  to	  find	  mutually	  agreeable	  solutions	  will	  reach	  better	  and	  more	  fulfilling	  results.	  	  However,	  sacred	  values	  are	  essentially	  subjective.	  	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  some	  items	  or	  issues	  that	  are	  considered	  sacred	  by	  one	  person	  or	  group	  will	  receive	  the	  same	  designation	  amongst	  other	  people	  or	  groups	  (Augsburger	  1992,	  Fiske	  &	  Tetlock,	  2000).	  	  Sacred	  values	  are	  so	  important	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  ignored,	  or	  treated	  like	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  negotiation.	  	  Fiske	  and	  Tetlock	  (2000)	  show	  that	  people	  respond	  the	  same,	  with	  moral	  outrage	  and	  more	  cleansing,	  when	  they	  feel	  that	  their	  most	  deeply	  held	  values	  are	  being	  ignored	  as	  when	  they	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  under	  direct	  attack.	  While	  issues	  involving	  sacred	  values	  are	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  resolve,	  Atran	  and	  Axelrod	  (2008)	  argue	  that	  they	  should	  be	  among	  the	  first	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed	  when	  engaging	  intractable	  conflicts.	  	  Their	  research	  indicates	  that	  issues	  involving	  sacred	  values	  may	  be	  effectively	  reframed	  if	  handled	  carefully	  and	  directly.	  	  They	  offer	  the	  following	  suggestions	  for	  potential	  interventions	  that	  may	  aid	  parties	  in	  reframing	  sacred	  values:	  1)	  Refine	  the	  parties’	  respective	  platforms	  to	  exclude	  statements	  or	  positions	  that	  are	  based	  on	  false	  criteria;	  2)	  Shift	  the	  context	  of	  the	  dispute	  to	  the	  future;	  3)	  Prioritize	  values;	  4)	  Show	  respect	  whenever	  possible;	  5)	  Extend	  apologies	  for	  instances	  where	  regret	  is	  felt;	  and	  6)	  Make	  sure	  that	  the	  people	  responsible	  for	  transgressions	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  identified	  as	  responsible.	  	  Through	  these	  interventions,	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  two	  parties	  can	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  major	  issues	  apart	  from	  their	  respective	  values,	  and	  can	  therefore	  begin	  to	  negotiate	  in	  a	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way	  that	  will	  avoid	  the	  appearance	  of	  attack	  on	  sacred	  values	  while	  addressing	  the	  negotiable	  parts	  of	  the	  conflict.	  Fiske	  and	  Tetlock	  (1997)	  maintain	  a	  similar	  argument.	  	  They	  believe	  that	  by	  using	  many	  of	  the	  interventions	  mentioned	  by	  Atran	  and	  Axelrod	  (2008),	  plus	  validating	  the	  signs	  of	  anger	  and	  frustration	  that	  arise	  at	  the	  thought	  of	  compromising	  sacred	  values,	  can	  ease	  moral	  outrage	  and	  moral	  cleansing	  and	  lead	  parties	  to	  a	  pluralistic	  understanding	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  maintaining	  moral	  and	  sacred	  integrity	  while	  addressing	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  Further,	  the	  process	  that	  they	  prescribe	  strongly	  supports	  collaborative	  brainstorming	  and	  solution	  generation	  that	  involves	  all	  parties	  working	  collectively	  to	  come	  up	  with	  options	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  mutually	  beneficial	  solutions.	  Frame	  analysis	  has	  existed	  in	  the	  conflict	  resolution	  discourse	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  though	  it	  has	  not	  been	  thoroughly	  or	  explicitly	  explored.	  	  As	  shown	  above,	  understanding	  how	  parties	  to	  a	  conflict	  frame	  and	  reframe	  issues,	  strategies,	  or	  events	  central	  to	  the	  conflict	  can	  be	  very	  helpful	  in	  designing	  the	  resolution	  processes.	  	  Understanding	  how	  each	  party	  to	  a	  conflict	  frames	  peace	  with	  the	  other	  and	  violence	  as	  a	  conflict	  engagement	  strategy,	  both	  in	  general	  and	  in	  context	  of	  the	  existing	  conflict,	  are	  essential	  in	  designing	  a	  conflict	  intervention	  system.	  	  Naturally,	  there	  are	  several	  elements	  that	  affect	  the	  way	  that	  individuals	  and	  groups	  come	  to	  frame	  peace	  and	  violent,	  or	  armed	  engagement,	  and	  I	  will	  unpack	  many	  of	  them	  in	  what	  follows.	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Framing	  Violence	  and	  Armed	  Movements	  
	   Violence	  stated	  simply,	  is	  an	  action	  that	  causes	  harm	  to	  persons	  or	  their	  property.	  	  Violence	  can	  be	  either	  direct	  or	  indirect	  (Galtung,	  1969).	  	  Direct	  violence	  is	  an	  immediate	  act	  to	  do	  bodily	  harm	  to	  another	  person.	  	  Indirect	  violence	  is	  largely	  systemic,	  or	  structural,	  and	  it	  exists	  in	  a	  more	  covert	  way	  that	  affects	  the	  victim	  that	  is	  not	  necessarily	  physical	  or	  immediate.	  	  It	  is	  often	  normalized	  in	  societies	  and	  is	  readily	  overlooked	  by	  those	  who	  do	  not	  suffer	  from	  it	  (Curle,	  1971;	  Galtung,	  1969;	  Jacoby,	  2008).	  	  Some	  examples	  of	  indirect	  violence	  include	  discriminatory	  policies,	  rules	  or	  social	  norms	  that	  disadvantage	  groups	  of	  people	  socially,	  politically,	  and	  economically.	  	  My	  central	  focus	  in	  this	  section	  will	  be	  to	  look	  at	  the	  different	  factors	  that	  cause	  groups	  of	  people	  to	  support	  armed	  movements,	  or	  engage	  in	  direct	  violence.	  	   Reychler	  (2001)	  identifies	  violent	  conflict	  as	  a	  system	  in	  which	  two	  interdependent	  parties,	  who	  experience	  the	  relationship	  as	  negative,	  have	  the	  means	  and	  opportunity	  to	  use	  armed	  tactics	  and	  view	  violence	  as	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  means	  of	  engaging	  the	  conflict.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  violent	  interventions	  are	  used	  when	  parties	  believe	  their	  opponents	  to	  be	  hostile	  and	  conclude	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  engage	  with	  that	  party	  is	  through	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  	  Similarly,	  Moore	  and	  Jaggers	  (1990)	  argue	  that	  individuals	  come	  to	  support	  armed	  movements	  when	  they	  identify	  a	  grievance	  that	  they	  wish	  to	  see	  rectified,	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  connection	  to	  the	  larger	  group	  that	  shares	  the	  grievance,	  attribute	  blame	  for	  a	  grievance	  to	  an	  opposing	  party,	  believe	  that	  violence	  in	  the	  situation	  is	  justified	  and	  will	  be	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effective.5	  	  The	  longer	  that	  a	  conflict	  persists,	  and	  the	  more	  pessimistic	  that	  a	  group	  becomes	  about	  its	  eventual	  resolution,	  the	  more	  likely	  the	  group	  will	  be	  to	  support	  and	  resort	  to	  armed	  tactics	  (Gat,	  2009;	  Staub,	  2011).	  	   According	  to	  Bartos	  and	  Wehr	  (2002)	  violence	  or	  force	  is	  a	  conflict	  engagement	  tool	  that	  is	  utilized	  by	  one	  party	  to	  coerce	  an	  opponent	  into	  giving	  in.	  	  Bartos	  and	  Wehr	  view	  these	  tactics	  as	  largely	  ineffective	  because	  they	  invoke	  a	  similar	  response	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  series	  of	  escalation	  in	  the	  violence.	  	  Staub	  (2011)	  holds	  a	  similar	  position	  that	  coercive	  action	  is	  largely	  ineffective,	  but	  becomes	  increasingly	  appealing	  to	  groups	  who	  view	  the	  other	  party	  as	  unreasonable,	  or	  do	  not	  see	  the	  other	  party	  as	  willing	  to	  work	  collaboratively.	  	  Violence,	  then,	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  be	  used	  when	  a	  group	  believes	  that	  a	  collaborative	  option	  to	  resolving	  the	  conflict	  does	  not	  exist.	  	  This	  is	  often	  because	  they	  are	  entrenched	  in	  their	  position,	  which	  they	  view	  as	  non-­‐negotiable	  (Atran	  &	  Axelrod,	  2008;	  Fisher	  &	  Ury,	  1991)	  or	  because	  they	  perceive	  the	  other	  party	  as	  unwilling	  to	  negotiate	  (Bartos	  and	  Wehr,	  2002;	  Lederach,	  1998;	  Staub,	  2011).	  	   Similarly,	  groups	  tend	  to	  support	  violent	  forms	  of	  conflict	  engagement	  in	  cases	  of	  retaliation	  (Allred,	  2000;	  Jacoby,	  2008).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  violence	  if	  they	  believe	  themselves	  to	  be	  victims	  of	  aggression.	  	  According	  to	  Allred	  (2000),	  violent	  actions	  are	  utilized	  when	  one	  party	  believes	  that	  another	  has	  harmed	  them	  and	  either	  denies	  it	  or	  does	  not	  take	  immediate	  action	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  definition	  is	  notably	  comparable	  to	  Benford	  and	  Snow’s	  (1988)	  description	  of	  the	  diagnostic,	  prognostic,	  and	  motivational	  framing	  tasks.	  	  Moor	  and	  Jaggers	  (1990)	  definition	  of	  violent	  movement	  has	  a	  diagnostic	  element-­‐	  defining	  the	  grievance	  and	  attributing	  blame,	  a	  prognostic	  element-­‐	  supporting	  violence	  as	  a	  justifiable	  and	  effective	  means	  of	  engaging	  the	  identified	  issues,	  and	  motivational-­‐	  relies	  on	  connection	  to	  a	  group	  and	  access	  to	  resources.	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repair	  the	  damage.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  harmed	  party	  becomes	  angry	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  retaliate.	  	  Bartos	  and	  Wehr	  (2002),	  in	  their	  description	  of	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	  coercion,	  argue	  that	  attempts	  by	  one	  party	  to	  forcefully	  coerce	  another	  into	  agreeing	  with	  their	  position	  is	  met	  with	  similar	  tactics	  that	  lead	  to	  escalation	  and	  further	  violence.	  	  It	  follows	  that	  parties	  tend	  to	  show	  greater	  support	  for	  violent	  engagement	  tactics	  the	  longer	  that	  the	  conflict	  persists	  and	  the	  more	  attacks	  that	  they	  perceive	  to	  have	  been	  directed	  at	  them.	  	   Burton	  (1990),	  taking	  a	  slightly	  broader	  view,	  describes	  conflict	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  party	  believes	  another	  to	  be	  infringing	  on	  their	  basic	  human	  needs.	  	  Included	  within	  the	  concept	  of	  basic	  human	  needs	  are	  physical	  needs	  like	  food,	  water,	  and	  shelter	  as	  well	  as	  psychological	  needs	  like	  security,	  control,	  positive	  identity,	  and	  connection	  (Allred,	  2000;	  Burton,	  1990;	  Staub,	  2003).	  	  Oftentimes,	  when	  individuals	  or	  groups	  believe	  their	  needs	  are	  being	  attacked,	  they	  will	  respond	  with	  violence	  to	  defend	  those	  needs	  (Christie,	  2006).	  	  Staub	  (2011)	  argues	  that	  parties	  will	  increase	  support	  for	  armed	  engagement	  when	  they	  are	  desperate	  to	  defend	  resources	  perceived	  as	  necessary	  to	  their	  survival,	  or	  relevant	  to	  their	  honor,	  pride,	  or	  other	  psychological	  needs.	  	   It	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  the	  descriptions	  above	  rely	  on	  parties’	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  a	  situation.	  	  For	  example,	  an	  individual	  may	  believe	  that	  his	  or	  her	  opponent	  is	  unwilling	  to	  compromise	  on	  a	  given	  issue	  and	  therefore	  support	  violent	  engagement.	  	  The	  individual’s	  perception	  may	  not	  be	  built	  on	  fact	  or	  reality,	  but	  because	  she	  or	  he	  has	  come	  to	  believe	  it,	  she	  or	  he	  will	  continue	  to	  support	  violent	  tactics	  (Allred,	  2011).	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  ways	  that	  groups	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come	  to	  frame	  various	  concepts	  are	  largely	  affected	  by	  media	  representations,	  popular	  wisdom,	  and	  recent	  history	  (Gamson,	  1992).	  	  Through	  these	  mediums,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  group	  to	  become	  convinced	  that	  they	  have	  an	  enemy	  that	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  forcefully.	  	  The	  leaders	  of	  a	  party	  in	  any	  given	  conflict	  have	  very	  significant	  impacts	  on	  the	  way	  that	  the	  members	  of	  that	  party	  frame	  violence.	  	  If	  the	  other	  group	  can	  be	  painted	  as	  ideologically	  opposed	  to	  peace,	  an	  immediate	  threat	  to	  their	  needs,	  as	  acting	  aggressively,	  or	  as	  unreasonable,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  group	  will	  more	  strongly	  support	  violence	  against	  the	  other	  party,	  regardless	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  perceptions.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  parties	  in	  intractable	  conflict	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  one-­‐sided	  or	  biased	  sources	  of	  information	  and	  reaffirm	  and	  strengthen	  commitments	  to	  their	  interpretation	  of	  history	  (Rouhana	  &	  Bar-­‐Tal,	  1998).	  
Framing	  Peace	  
	   Similar	  to	  violence,	  peace	  is	  an	  abstract	  term	  that	  is	  frequently	  used	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  discourse.	  	  Also	  similar	  to	  violence,	  defining	  the	  term	  has	  not	  been	  easy	  for	  scholars	  or	  practitioners.	  	  Peace	  is	  often	  spoken	  of	  rather	  lightly	  and	  incompletely	  (Christie,	  2006;	  Galtung,	  1979;	  Lederach,	  1995).	  	  Peace	  tends	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  direct	  and	  overt	  physical	  violence.	  	  This	  definition	  of	  peace	  is	  troubling	  to	  many	  peace	  theorists	  because	  it	  does	  not	  address	  indirect	  and	  psychological	  violence.	  	  Galtung	  (1969)	  describes	  situations	  in	  which	  direct	  violence	  is	  not	  being	  used	  but	  there	  exists	  significant	  issues	  indirect	  violence	  as	  a	  cold	  peace.	  	  Similarly,	  Curle	  (1971)	  argues	  that	  peace	  exists	  when	  one	  party	  repairs	  and	  restructures	  its	  relationship	  to	  another	  in	  a	  way	  that	  addresses	  structural	  discrimination	  and	  injustices.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  conflicting	  parties	  must	  address	  all	  
	   30	  
forms	  of	  violence	  that	  exist	  between	  the	  two	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  peaceful	  relationship.	  	  Schafft	  (2009)	  adds	  that	  peace	  cannot	  be	  ethically	  achieved	  or	  sustained	  unless	  proper	  justice	  has	  been	  served	  and	  proper	  reparations	  have	  been	  made.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  am	  mostly	  concerned	  with	  how	  groups	  in	  conflict	  come	  to	  frame	  peace,	  and	  how	  different	  events	  shape	  their	  optimism	  or	  pessimism	  on	  the	  topic.	  	   A	  central	  issue	  to	  peacebuilding	  is	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  that	  the	  parties	  have	  in	  each	  other	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  conflict	  resolution	  process	  in	  good	  faith	  and	  to	  follow	  through	  on	  their	  agreements	  (Lederach,	  1995;	  Mayer,	  2009).	  	  The	  faith	  that	  parties	  have	  in	  their	  opponents	  to	  make	  and	  keep	  agreements	  made	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  processes	  directly	  affect	  their	  optimism	  in	  a	  possible	  peaceful	  resolution.	  	  If	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  enters	  into	  a	  resolution	  process	  without	  the	  intention	  or	  ability	  to	  authentically	  negotiate	  the	  issues,	  the	  process	  will	  likely	  fall	  apart	  and	  leave	  the	  parties	  at	  least	  as	  polarized	  as	  before,	  and	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case	  several	  times	  in	  a	  row,	  parties	  will	  decide	  to	  look	  for	  other	  means	  of	  conflict	  engagement	  (Lederach,	  1998).	  	  Similarly,	  if	  a	  party	  fails	  to	  implement	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  given	  agreement,	  the	  process	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  farce	  and	  a	  waste	  of	  time	  that	  they	  will	  wish	  to	  avoid	  in	  the	  future.	  	  If	  a	  group	  of	  people	  is	  to	  believe	  that	  peace	  is	  possible,	  they	  must	  have	  faith	  that	  they	  have	  a	  partner	  to	  work	  with	  (Staub,	  2011).	  	   Another	  issue	  in	  the	  development	  of	  peace	  frames	  is	  the	  level	  of	  existing	  structural	  violence	  (Bartos	  and	  Wehr,	  2002;	  Christie,	  2006;	  Curle,	  1971;	  Jacoby,	  2008).	  	  If	  a	  group	  perceives	  itself	  as	  being	  systemically	  oppressed,	  it	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  other	  group	  is	  authentically	  interested	  in	  a	  peace	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agreement	  (Schafft,	  2009).	  	  Indirect	  violence	  or	  structural	  violence	  attacks	  the	  psychological	  needs	  of	  a	  victim,	  which	  are	  amongst	  the	  issues	  largely	  considered	  to	  be	  non-­‐negotiable	  (Burton,	  1990).	  	  	  If	  the	  conflict	  resolution	  or	  peacebuilding	  process	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  existing	  oppressive	  realities,	  it	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  undesirable.	  	  Ignoring	  oppressive	  structures	  in	  peacebuilding	  may	  come	  across	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  normalize	  them,	  thus	  extending	  and	  amplifying	  injustice.	  	  Further,	  an	  agreement	  will	  likely	  be	  unsustainable	  because	  the	  underlying	  issues	  will	  produce	  future	  grievances	  that	  could	  erupt	  into	  new	  sequences	  of	  violence.	  	  Parties	  that	  are	  truly	  interested	  in	  good-­‐faith	  negotiations	  should	  take	  steps	  to	  correct	  the	  oppressive	  realities	  of	  their	  respective	  systems	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  goodwill.	  	  Policy	  changes	  show	  that	  the	  stronger	  parties	  are	  authentically	  committed	  to	  a	  holistic	  agreement	  that	  will	  allow	  for	  a	  sustainable	  situation.	  	  This	  will	  build	  their	  confidence	  in	  the	  other	  in	  their	  opponent’s	  desire	  to	  make	  peace.	  	   As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  way	  that	  a	  group	  comes	  to	  understand	  its	  opponents,	  derived	  largely	  from	  their	  representation	  in	  the	  media,	  popular	  wisdom,	  and	  recent	  history,	  affects	  the	  way	  that	  they	  frame	  different	  conflict	  issues.	  	  Cycles	  of	  emnification	  and	  dehumanization	  are	  regular	  in	  conflict	  and	  are	  detrimental	  to	  resolution	  processes.	  	  In	  intractable	  conflicts,	  parties	  tend	  to	  view	  their	  opponents	  as	  wrong,	  evil,	  or	  antithetical	  to	  their	  respective	  goals	  (Rouhana	  &	  Bar-­‐Tal,	  1998),	  and,	  therefore,	  believe	  that	  the	  prospects	  for	  peace	  with	  that	  group	  are	  miniscule.	  	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  bring	  the	  parties	  into	  a	  viable	  resolution	  process,	  peacebuilding	  interventions	  need	  to	  be	  designed	  and	  implemented	  to	  change	  how	  each	  party	  perceives	  the	  other.	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   The	  most	  prevalent	  types	  of	  conflict	  interventions	  that	  seek	  to	  build	  new	  understandings	  of	  opposing	  groups	  tend	  to	  be	  based	  on	  Allport’s	  (1954)	  contact	  
hypothesis,	  which	  essentially	  predicts	  that	  the	  more	  direct	  interaction	  that	  one	  group	  has	  with	  another,	  the	  better	  each	  group	  will	  perceive	  the	  other.	  	  Since	  Allport	  released	  his	  hypothesis,	  scholars	  have	  identified	  several	  potential	  problems	  with	  it.	  	  While	  the	  hypothesis	  has	  not	  been	  entirely	  disproved,	  scholars	  now	  stipulate	  that	  contact	  should	  be	  frequent,	  specifically	  designed,	  and	  purposeful	  (Bramel,	  2004;	  Brewer	  &	  Miller,	  1996).	  	  The	  problem	  with	  these	  specifications	  is	  that	  they	  take	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  and	  can	  be	  rather	  costly.	  	  Further,	  in	  terms	  of	  peacebuilding,	  contact	  hypothesis	  alone	  is	  not	  able	  to	  fully	  account	  for	  structural	  or	  political	  issues	  that	  are	  controlled	  by	  individuals	  closer	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  hierarchy.	  	  Contact	  interventions	  tend	  to	  take	  place	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  contact-­‐based	  programs	  should	  not	  be	  implemented	  in	  cases	  of	  intractable	  conflicts.	  	  If	  effectively	  implemented,	  these	  interventions	  can	  help	  groups	  to	  correctly	  attribute	  blame	  for	  problems,	  and	  to	  gain	  an	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  people	  that	  they	  are	  in	  contact	  with.	  	  However,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  political,	  or	  higher	  level,	  engagement,	  these	  interventions	  coupled	  with	  failure	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  processes	  could	  prove	  to	  further	  stagnate	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict.	  Lederach	  (1995)	  warns	  that	  peace	  is	  often	  presented	  to	  parties	  as	  a	  façade	  to	  allow	  a	  party	  to	  increase	  its	  relative	  power	  without	  the	  other’s	  knowledge.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  conflicts	  with	  histories	  of	  false	  peace	  offerings	  become	  more	  intractable	  and	  more	  violent	  because	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  offer	  eventually	  learns	  the	  intentions	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of	  the	  party	  offering	  the	  peace	  and	  responds	  aggressively.	  	  Curle	  (1971)	  suggests	  that	  the	  use	  of	  peace	  for	  purely	  self-­‐interested	  reasons	  almost	  inevitably	  causes	  future	  conflict	  that	  will	  likely	  be	  more	  violent	  and	  difficult	  to	  resolve	  because	  there	  is	  not	  trust	  in	  the	  relationship.	  	  Lederach	  (2005)	  observes	  that	  parties	  in	  intractable	  conflict	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  pessimism	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  effective	  resolution	  of	  their	  conflict	  as	  a	  coping	  skill	  to	  prevent	  the	  disappointment	  that	  they	  have	  experienced	  the	  several	  times	  that	  they	  were	  told	  peace	  was	  close	  and	  then	  did	  not	  happen.	  	  	  From	  the	  sources	  above,	  it	  appears	  likely	  that	  peace	  will	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  until	  the	  parties	  have	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  and	  will	  benefit	  them.	  	  To	  pursue	  peace	  that	  is	  less	  than	  authentic	  and	  does	  not	  address	  the	  systemic	  issues	  inherent	  to	  intractable	  conflicts	  will	  cause	  parties	  to	  lose	  faith	  in	  peacebuilding	  initiatives	  or	  conflict	  resolution	  processes,	  thus	  leaving	  the	  conflict	  more	  intractable.	  	  Conversely,	  peacebuilding	  initiatives	  steeped	  in	  good	  faith	  that	  show	  commitment	  to	  engaging	  all	  elements	  of	  a	  given	  conflict	  can	  produce	  a	  process	  that	  the	  parties	  can	  believe	  in.	  	  If	  a	  group	  cannot	  frame	  peace	  in	  a	  positive	  or	  desirable	  way,	  then	  it	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  work	  for	  it.	  










	   35	  
	  
The	  Survey	  
	   The	  survey	  was	  divided	  into	  two	  distinct	  parts.6	  	  Part	  one	  consisted	  of	  sixteen	  questions	  concerning	  ways	  that	  participants	  understand	  and	  think	  about	  peace,	  first	  in	  general,	  and	  then	  in	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Israeli	  conflict.	  	  Participants	  were	  first	  asked	  to	  write,	  in	  one	  to	  three	  sentences,	  a	  definition	  of	  peace	  in	  their	  own	  words.	  	  Participants	  were	  prompted	  to	  define	  the	  term	  in	  general,	  and	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  Next,	  participants	  were	  asked,	  based	  on	  the	  definition	  that	  they	  had	  written,	  how	  likely	  they	  believe	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be.	  They	  were	  given	  the	  following	  options:	  Impossible,	  very	  unlikely,	  unlikely,	  likely,	  and	  very	  likely.	  	  Then,	  also	  based	  on	  their	  personal	  conceptualization	  of	  peace,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  how	  desirable	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  and	  given	  the	  options:	  Very	  desirable,	  moderately	  
desirable,	  neutral,	  moderately	  undesirable,	  and	  very	  undesirable.	  	  The	  first	  section	  ended	  with	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  examining	  the	  perceived	  implications	  for	  different	  hypothetical	  situations:	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  believed	  that	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution,	  if	  implemented	  along	  the	  1967	  borders	  with	  Palestinian	  East	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  Palestinian	  capital,	  would	  make	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  relations	  more	  or	  less	  peaceful.	  	  Except	  for	  the	  two	  open-­‐answer	  questions,	  all	  of	  the	  questions	  on	  this	  part	  of	  the	  survey	  were	  multiple	  choice,	  and	  some	  left	  room	  for	  comments.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  survey	  consisted	  of	  twelve	  questions	  that	  sought	  to	  understand	  how	  Palestinians	  frame	  armed	  struggle,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  in	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  answer	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  believe	  violence	  is	  justified,	  both	  in	  general	  and	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  To	  view	  the	  survey,	  see	  Appendix	  A	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context	  of	  their	  conflict.	  	  To	  understand	  how	  violence,	  or	  armed	  struggle,	  is	  framed,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  series	  of	  hypothetical	  situations	  in	  which	  violence	  may	  be	  used.	  	  For	  each	  question	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  choose	  from	  the	  following	  options:	  strongly	  agree,	  agree,	  neutral,	  disagree,	  and	  strongly	  disagree.	  	   The	  survey	  was	  designed	  and	  written	  in	  English	  and	  then	  translated	  into	  Arabic	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people	  who	  are	  native	  Arabic	  speakers	  and	  also	  fluent	  in	  English.	  	  A	  number	  of	  challenges	  arose	  in	  the	  translation	  process	  because	  several	  of	  the	  words	  and	  phrases	  had	  to	  be	  adapted	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  Palestinian	  culture.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  translators	  had	  an	  extremely	  difficult	  time	  deciding	  how	  to	  find	  a	  word	  to	  describe	  violent,	  or	  armed,	  resistance.	  	  The	  first	  copies	  of	  the	  survey	  that	  were	  distributed	  for	  comment	  by	  a	  few	  professors	  and	  students	  used	  the	  word	  that	  most	  closely	  to	  violence	  several	  times	  throughout	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  survey.	  	  The	  use	  of	  this	  word	  was	  met	  with	  a	  very	  strong	  and	  negative	  reaction.	  	  Respondents	  expressed	  that	  it	  was	  a	  biased	  term	  that	  had	  a	  condemning	  feel	  to	  it.	  	  After	  considering	  these	  strong	  responses,	  a	  term	  was	  suggested	  that	  means	  to	  struggle,	  or	  to	  resist,	  with	  force.	  	  The	  translators	  agreed	  that	  the	  word	  selected	  was	  the	  most	  unbiased	  way	  of	  discussing	  resistance	  methods	  that	  necessarily	  involve	  violent	  interaction.	  	   I	  chose	  to	  develop	  a	  survey	  for	  this	  part	  of	  the	  project	  because	  of	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  standardized	  means	  for	  evaluating	  the	  different	  frames	  of	  peace	  and	  violence.	  	  Using	  a	  survey	  to	  gauge	  common	  frames	  of	  these	  issues	  allows	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  collective	  framing	  processes	  because	  every	  respondent	  was	  answering	  exactly	  the	  same	  questions.	  	  Further,	  data	  from	  surveys	  is	  easily	  sorted	  and	  can	  be	  used	  much	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more	  effectively	  to	  explore	  potential	  correlations.	  	  The	  open-­‐answer	  question	  gave	  respondents	  more	  liberty	  in	  answering,	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  still	  easily	  evaluated.	  
Group	  Interviews	  	   As	  stated,	  the	  survey	  was	  developed	  with	  the	  hopes	  of	  providing	  a	  clear	  description	  of	  how	  Palestinians	  students	  frame	  peace	  and	  violence.	  	  To	  understand	  how	  those	  frames	  were	  formed,	  and	  what	  influences	  continue	  to	  shape	  them,	  I	  designed	  a	  group	  interview	  process	  to	  supplement	  the	  survey.	  The	  objective	  of	  conducting	  interviews	  was	  to	  create	  a	  conversational	  atmosphere	  in	  which	  participants	  could	  speak	  freely	  and	  candidly	  with	  each	  other	  and	  the	  discussion	  facilitator.	  	  To	  accomplish	  this,	  I	  designed	  a	  ten-­‐question	  script	  that	  would	  guide	  each	  group	  discussion.7	  	  The	  questions	  on	  the	  script	  were	  very	  broad	  and	  were	  designed	  to	  start	  conversations.	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  explain	  how	  they	  view	  peace,	  how	  their	  views	  have	  formed,	  and	  how	  they	  believe	  Palestinians	  should	  engage	  in	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  It	  was	  not	  deemed	  absolutely	  necessary	  that	  each	  discussion	  group	  answer	  every	  question,	  in	  fact,	  no	  group	  did.	  	  However,	  each	  group	  started	  the	  same	  way,	  and	  the	  script	  provided	  a	  process	  to	  move	  through	  in	  the	  conversation	  a	  structured	  way.	  	   When	  designing	  the	  survey	  for	  this	  project,	  I	  decided	  early	  on	  that	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  if	  participants	  could	  explain	  their	  answers	  from	  the	  survey	  more	  thoroughly.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  essential	  that	  the	  medium	  used	  for	  further	  explanation	  allow	  for	  maximum	  expression	  in	  a	  way	  that	  felt	  comfortable	  and	  safe	  for	  respondents.	  	  By	  participating	  in	  group	  interviews,	  participants	  were	  enabled	  speak	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  To	  view	  the	  interview	  script,	  see	  Appendix	  B	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more	  candidly	  because	  their	  in-­‐depth	  responses	  were	  not	  tied	  directly	  to	  their	  responses	  on	  the	  survey.	  	  	  
Data	  Collection	  The	  data	  was	  collected	  in	  two	  basic	  steps.	  	  First,	  student	  volunteers	  distributed	  the	  survey,	  and	  after	  participants	  completed	  their	  survey,	  they	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  would	  like	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  group	  discussion	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  elaborate	  on	  their	  responses.	  The	  survey	  was	  distributed	  randomly	  to	  students	  from	  four	  different	  universities-­‐	  An-­‐Najah	  University	  in	  Nablus,	  Al	  Quds	  University	  in	  Abu	  Dis,	  Birziet	  University	  near	  Ramallah,	  and	  Bethlehem	  University.	  	  Current	  students	  at	  each	  university	  volunteered	  to	  help	  recruit	  participants.	  	  The	  students	  responsible	  for	  distribution	  discussed	  the	  survey	  with	  each	  participant,	  explained	  how	  the	  results	  were	  to	  be	  used,	  and	  assured	  them	  that	  their	  names	  would	  not	  be	  recorded	  and	  that	  extensive	  care	  would	  be	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  confidentiality.	  	  Each	  participant	  completed	  the	  survey	  alone	  and	  returned	  the	  finished	  survey	  to	  the	  person	  who	  provided	  it.	  	  Those	  distributing	  surveys	  were	  carefully	  instructed	  to	  pass	  the	  survey	  out	  to	  people	  in	  different	  areas	  of	  campus	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  sample	  was	  as	  random	  as	  possible.	  	  I	  was	  always	  present	  when	  surveys	  were	  handed	  out	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  person	  distributing	  them	  was	  following	  proper	  protocol	  and	  to	  answer	  any	  questions	  that	  the	  aid	  was	  unprepared	  for.	  Over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  months,	  260	  surveys	  were	  collected,	  102	  were	  collected	  at	  An-­‐Najah	  University,	  79	  from	  Birzeit	  University,	  43	  from	  Bethlehem	  University,	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and	  36	  from	  Al	  Quds	  University.	  8	  	  The	  number	  of	  participants	  selected	  from	  each	  university	  correlates	  to	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  each.	  	  For	  example,	  An-­‐Najah	  University	  is	  the	  largest	  university	  in	  the	  West	  Bank;	  so	  more	  surveys	  were	  collected	  from	  that	  campus.	  	  Of	  all	  respondents,	  129	  were	  female	  and	  the	  131	  were	  male,	  and	  the	  ages	  of	  people	  polled	  were	  between	  17	  and	  25,	  with	  an	  average	  of	  age	  of	  20.	  	  	  As	  noted,	  after	  the	  participants	  completed	  the	  survey	  portion,	  they	  were	  asked	  if	  would	  like	  to	  join	  a	  group	  interview.	  	  Each	  interview	  took	  between	  forty-­‐five	  minutes	  and	  one	  hour,	  and	  would	  start	  once	  at	  least	  eight	  participants	  agreed	  to	  join.	  	  The	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  Arabic,	  and	  translated	  into	  English.	  	  Before	  each	  discussion	  began,	  participants	  were	  again	  assured	  that	  their	  identities	  would	  not	  be	  revealed	  and	  that	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  project	  would	  not	  be	  used	  against	  them.	  	  This	  allowed	  for	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  candidness	  because	  of	  the	  secure	  feeling	  of	  being	  able	  to	  express	  their	  opinions	  anonymously.	  	  For	  each	  group,	  either	  the	  group	  facilitator	  or	  myself	  would	  take	  notes	  on	  the	  key	  points	  of	  the	  discussion,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  appeared	  to	  be	  general	  agreement	  or	  counterpoints	  to	  each	  point	  made.	  Each	  group	  had	  a	  facilitator	  who	  was	  charged	  with	  asking	  for	  clarification	  and	  elaboration	  when	  necessary,	  as	  well	  as	  encouraging	  each	  participant	  to	  respond	  to	  questions.	  	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  confidentiality,	  interviews	  were	  not	  transcribed	  or	  recorded.	  	  Instead	  notes	  were	  taken	  to	  include	  key	  points,	  points	  of	  general	  agreement,	  points	  of	  disagreement,	  and	  how	  many	  people	  in	  each	  group	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	  a	  response.	  	  There	  were	  twelve	  groups	  total,	  and	  each	  group	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  About	  275	  surveys	  were	  collected	  in	  total,	  but	  a	  number	  were	  immediately	  discarded	  for	  either	  not	  completing	  essential	  parts	  of	  the	  survey	  or	  failing	  to	  complete	  the	  survey.	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contained	  between	  eight	  and	  twelve	  participants.	  	  In	  total,	  105	  students	  participated	  in	  group	  interviews	  to	  some	  extent.	  Of	  the	  interviewees,	  62	  were	  male	  and	  43	  were	  female.	  
Population	  	   Early	  in	  the	  design	  process,	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  limit	  the	  pool	  of	  respondents	  to	  students	  at	  universities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  for	  two	  primary	  reasons.	  	  First,	  students	  were	  more	  easily	  accessible	  and	  available.	  	  It	  was	  relatively	  easy	  to	  go	  to	  a	  university	  campus	  and	  meet	  with	  students	  in	  between	  classes.	  	  Second,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  student	  population	  represents	  the	  upcoming	  generation,	  and	  the	  future	  determinants	  of	  Palestinian	  decision-­‐making.	  	  They	  will	  be	  the	  ones	  who	  will	  decide	  how	  Palestine	  will	  engage	  with	  the	  conflict	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.	  	  As	  the	  students	  transition	  to	  adulthood,	  they	  will	  become	  more	  influential	  in	  Palestinian	  society,	  and	  will	  become	  the	  primary	  influence	  on	  Palestinian	  policy.	  	  If	  they	  come	  to	  frame	  peace	  with	  Israel	  as	  a	  plausible	  and	  desirable	  outcome,	  then	  the	  chances	  of	  an	  effective	  and	  holistic	  peace	  agreement	  in	  the	  future	  will	  be	  more	  attainable.	  
Data	  Analysis	  	   After	  all	  of	  the	  data	  was	  collected	  and	  recorded,	  I	  analyzed	  it	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  First,	  after	  reading	  all	  of	  the	  open	  answer	  responses,	  I	  grouped	  the	  surveys	  into	  categories	  of	  similar	  responses.	  	  These	  groups	  represent	  four	  identifiably	  unique	  framings	  of	  peace.	  	  Then,	  I	  looked	  for	  differences	  in	  responses	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  survey	  based	  on	  the	  framing	  categories	  to	  see	  if	  there	  was	  stronger	  tendencies	  to	  desire	  peace	  with	  Israel	  or	  to	  see	  how	  possible	  each	  category	  found	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be.	  	  Next,	  I	  repeated	  the	  process	  for	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  survey	  to	  expose	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variations	  in	  support	  for	  armed	  engagement	  strategies	  between	  the	  four	  different	  peace	  frame	  groups	  that	  I	  identified.	  
Limitations	  
	   While	  the	  data	  collected	  will	  be	  useful	  in	  describing	  the	  formation	  of	  different	  framing	  processes	  among	  students	  in	  Palestinian	  universities,	  there	  are	  potential	  shortcomings	  to	  the	  methodology.	  	  First	  and	  foremost	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  translation.	  	  The	  survey	  was	  written	  first	  in	  English	  and	  then	  transcribed	  into	  Arabic.	  	  Participants	  responded	  in	  Arabic	  and	  their	  responses	  were	  transcribed	  into	  English.	  	  Two-­‐way	  translation	  increases	  the	  chance	  for	  error,	  both	  in	  translating	  the	  survey	  and	  the	  responses.	  	  To	  mitigate	  this,	  each	  survey	  was	  read	  by	  one	  of	  three	  experienced	  translators.	  	  If	  the	  translation	  was	  unclear	  or	  questionable,	  a	  second	  translator	  was	  consulted.	  	  If	  disagreement	  remained,	  the	  third	  translator	  would	  be	  consulted	  and	  the	  three	  would	  discuss	  and	  agree	  on	  the	  appropriate	  translation.	  	   Another	  limitation	  is	  the	  relatively	  small	  sample	  size.	  	  Extra	  care	  was	  taken	  to	  get	  a	  diverse	  and	  representative	  sample,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  in	  the	  process	  of	  this	  project	  to	  collect	  from	  the	  universities	  in	  Hebron	  or	  Jenin.	  	  While	  this	  is	  unfortunate,	  it	  is	  not	  debilitating.	  	  The	  universities	  that	  data	  was	  collected	  from	  are	  the	  biggest	  universities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  are	  spread	  out	  in	  a	  way	  that	  includes	  people	  from	  all	  regions	  in	  the	  territory.	  	  The	  locations	  for	  data	  collection	  were	  carefully	  considered	  when	  designing	  the	  process.	  	  The	  two	  largest	  universities,	  An-­‐Najah	  University	  in	  Nablus	  and	  Birziet	  University	  near	  Ramallah,	  were	  prioritized	  because	  they	  are	  the	  most	  recognizable	  universities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  Bethlehem	  University	  and	  Al	  Quds	  University	  in	  Abu	  Dis	  were	  added	  because	  of	  their	  proximity	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to	  Jerusalem	  and	  combined	  they	  attract	  students	  from	  the	  southern	  parts	  of	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	   The	  relatively	  small	  sample	  size	  also	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  consider	  the	  findings	  conclusive.	  	  While	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  give	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  peace	  and	  conflict	  engagement	  frames,	  there	  is	  room	  for	  error	  based	  on	  the	  population	  size.	  	  However,	  the	  results	  remained	  fairly	  consistent	  between	  institutions.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  this	  shows	  that	  more	  work	  is	  merited	  in	  frame	  analysis	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  Territories.	  	  Further,	  the	  data	  is	  convincing	  enough	  that	  it	  could	  be	  reasonably	  predicted	  that	  significantly	  increasing	  the	  sample	  size	  would	  render	  similar	  results,	  but	  this	  cannot	  be	  asserted	  definitively.	  	   The	  group	  interviews	  present	  a	  small	  challenge.	  	  First,	  none	  of	  the	  groups	  answered	  exactly	  the	  same	  questions.	  	  While	  each	  group	  began	  with	  similar	  prompts,	  each	  group	  tended	  to	  drift	  in	  distinct	  directions,	  which	  makes	  the	  data	  difficult	  to	  analyze.	  	  However,	  there	  were	  enough	  common	  points	  and	  discussion	  topics	  that	  were	  discussed	  in	  each	  group	  to	  gain	  some	  general	  understanding.	  	  Also,	  regarding	  some	  of	  the	  interview	  limitations,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  systematized	  method	  of	  recording	  responses	  for	  the	  interviews.	  	  Notes	  were	  taken	  on	  each	  conversation	  to	  record	  popular	  points	  and	  points	  of	  disagreement.	  	  These	  notes	  allow	  for	  several	  general	  conclusions	  to	  be	  drawn	  and	  work	  very	  well	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  surveys	  that	  were	  collected,	  but	  a	  more	  systematic	  means	  of	  recording	  the	  conversations	  may	  have	  allowed	  for	  a	  deeper	  analysis	  and	  more	  specific	  conclusions.	  	   Finally,	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  overlooked	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  researcher	  on	  the	  data	  collected.	  	  As	  a	  white	  American	  male	  entering	  Palestinian	  universities	  as	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a	  visitor,	  my	  presence	  undoubtedly	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  data	  collection.	  	  Among	  Palestinian	  students,	  there	  exists	  a	  distrust	  and	  skepticism	  of	  Americans,	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  complicated	  political	  relationship	  between	  Palestine,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  Israel.	  	  Many	  participants	  were	  uneasy	  about	  responding	  to	  the	  survey	  with	  a	  person	  from	  the	  United	  States	  present,	  because	  they	  feared	  that	  the	  information	  that	  they	  offered	  might	  be	  used	  against	  them.	  	  Due	  to	  this	  reality,	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  that	  opinions	  were	  altered,	  tempered,	  or	  excluded.	  	  These	  shortcomings	  were	  mitigated	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of,	  and	  reliance	  on,	  several	  Palestinians	  that	  aided	  in	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  this	  project.	  	  Before	  the	  survey	  was	  finished,	  it	  was	  presented	  to	  two	  Palestinian	  academics	  for	  their	  input,	  and	  then	  amended.	  	  When	  collecting	  the	  data,	  Palestinian	  students	  who	  could	  thoroughly	  explain	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  project	  and	  answer	  any	  questions	  always	  distributed	  the	  surveys.	  	  I	  was	  always	  present,	  but	  I	  was	  never	  the	  person	  distributing	  surveys	  or	  inviting	  participants.	  	  The	  survey	  and	  interview	  process	  were	  legitimized	  by	  the	  Palestinian	  students	  that	  helped	  with	  the	  data	  collection	  process.	  	   As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  data	  collection	  methods	  used	  in	  this	  project	  were	  intricately	  and	  intentionally	  designed	  in	  order	  to	  appropriately	  gather	  data	  to	  meet	  the	  goals	  set	  out	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  Great	  care	  was	  taken	  to	  address	  all	  of	  the	  potential	  limitations	  to	  this	  type	  of	  research	  process,	  and	  with	  the	  help	  of	  several	  Palestinian	  academics	  and	  students,	  a	  survey	  and	  group	  interview	  process	  were	  designed	  to	  work	  in	  concert	  with	  each	  other	  to	  effectively	  show	  the	  how	  Palestinians	  currently	  understand	  peace	  and	  violence,	  and	  what	  factors	  they	  believe	  to	  have	  influenced	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those	  frames.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  data	  that	  was	  collected	  and	  some	  conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  it.	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CHAPTER	  IV	  	  
	  
RESULTS	  	  	   The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  an	  in	  depth	  discussion	  about	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinian	  students	  in	  universities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  frame	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  violent,	  or	  armed,	  resistance.	  	  In	  the	  last	  chapter,	  I	  explained	  the	  process	  by	  which	  data	  was	  collected	  for	  this	  thesis,	  an	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  describe	  the	  collected	  data.	  
Justification	  of	  Frame	  Analysis	  	   As	  noted	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  thesis,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  framing	  processes	  and	  ideologies	  (Oliver	  and	  Johnson,	  2000).	  	  Frame	  analysis	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  lens	  of	  analysis	  for	  this	  project	  because	  of	  the	  malleable	  nature	  of	  frames,	  relative	  to	  ideologies	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  much	  more	  rigid	  (Snow	  and	  Benford,	  1988).	  	  If	  the	  data	  collected	  in	  this	  project	  had	  shown	  an	  ideological	  disposition	  against	  Jewish	  people,	  or	  towards	  any	  sort	  of	  conflict	  engagement	  strategy,	  then	  this	  thesis	  would	  require	  a	  different	  approach.	  	  However,	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  showed	  no	  overt	  signs	  of	  these	  ideological	  dispositions.	  	  Out	  of	  the	  260	  surveys	  collected,	  no	  respondent	  indicated	  a	  hatred	  of	  Jews	  or	  advocated	  for	  violence	  to	  be	  directed	  at	  Jewish	  people	  because	  of	  their	  ethnicity	  or	  religious	  background.	  	  Instead,	  desires	  for	  violence,	  both	  in	  the	  surveys	  and	  in	  the	  interviews,	  were	  motivated	  by	  issues	  of	  occupation,	  colonization,	  and	  self-­‐determination.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	  is	  not	  suggest	  that	  a	  long	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  long	  history	  of	  Anti-­‐Semitism,	  or	  that	  there	  are	  not	  individuals	  that	  are	  ideologically	  opposed	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  Jews	  or	  Judaism.	  	  Anti-­‐Semitism	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   This	  trend	  was	  repeated	  in	  the	  group	  interviews.	  	  Throughout	  the	  interview	  process,	  most	  individuals	  commented	  that	  their	  views	  on	  peace	  and	  armed	  struggle	  have	  been	  primarily	  influenced	  by	  negative	  interactions	  with	  Israeli	  policies	  like	  settlements	  and	  land	  use	  restrictions,	  encounters	  with	  soldiers	  at	  checkpoints,	  and	  issues	  with	  perceived	  colonial	  activity	  in	  general.	  	  Most	  individuals	  who	  argued	  for	  more	  aggressive	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  explain	  that	  the	  methods	  that	  were	  being	  advocated	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  directed	  towards	  all	  Jews,	  or	  even	  a	  Jewish	  presence	  in	  Historic	  Palestine,	  but	  at	  the	  persisting	  occupation	  of	  Palestinian	  lands.	  	   Finally,	  participants	  tended	  to	  frame	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  and	  as	  for	  purely	  defensive	  purposes.	  	  Two	  data	  sets	  from	  the	  survey	  sum	  this	  notion	  up	  relatively	  well.	  	  First,	  when	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  agree	  with	  the	  statement,	  “Violence	  should	  only	  be	  used	  for	  defensive	  purposes,	  such	  as	  self-­‐defense,”	  53%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  they	  either	  strongly	  agree	  or	  agree	  while	  30%	  indicated	  that	  they	  strongly	  disagree	  or	  disagree.	  	  The	  other	  17%	  claimed	  to	  be	  neutral	  on	  the	  issue	  [See	  figure	  4.1].	  	  Similarly,	  when	  presented	  with	  the	  statement,	  “Armed	  resistance	  should	  be	  the	  last	  resort	  of	  a	  resistance	  movement,”	  41%	  of	  respondents	  agreed,	  compared	  with	  37%	  that	  disagreed,	  while	  22%	  that	  claimed	  neutrality	  [See	  figure	  4.2].10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  remains	  a	  serious	  issue,	  and	  to	  suggest	  different	  would	  be	  a	  major	  injustice	  to	  Jewish	  people	  everywhere.	  	  10	  These	  statements	  do	  rely	  on	  a	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  what	  constitutes	  violence.	  	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  amongst	  Palestinians	  regarding	  the	  issue	  of	  stone	  throwing,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  deemed	  violent	  or	  not	  (Abu-­‐Nimer	  &	  Groves	  2003).	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  project,	  violence	  was	  described	  as	  something	  that	  could	  potentially	  induce	  enough	  physical	  harm	  to	  require	  a	  person	  to	  seek	  medical	  attention.	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   While	  I	  will	  spend	  significant	  time	  discussing	  how	  Palestinian	  students	  frame	  violent	  resistance,	  these	  two	  responses	  provide	  an	  excellent	  starting	  point	  because	  they	  illustrate	  that	  Palestinians	  are	  neither	  ideologically	  violent,	  nor	  do	  they	  hold	  a	  deep-­‐seeded	  hatred	  for	  either	  religious	  or	  cultural	  Jews.	  	  Because	  Palestinians	  do	  not	  show	  signs	  of	  being	  ideologically	  opposed	  to	  Judaism	  or	  Jewish	  people,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  analyze	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  data	  through	  a	  frame	  analysis	  lens.	  	  
Framing	  Peace	  	   In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  survey,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  write,	  in	  two	  to	  three	  sentences,	  a	  definition	  of	  peace	  in	  their	  own	  words.	  	  This	  definition	  was	  used	  to	  organize,	  or	  sort,	  participants	  into	  groups	  based	  on	  similar	  definitions.	  	  Of	  the	  261	  surveys	  gathered,	  223	  were	  evaluated	  based	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  defined	  peace.11	  	  The	  surveys	  that	  included	  definitions	  that	  were	  deemed	  helpful	  were	  separated	  into	  four	  groups	  based	  on	  similarities	  in	  the	  definitions.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  data,	  I	  considered	  these	  groups	  to	  represent	  the	  four	  dominant	  frames	  in	  Palestinian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  other	  38	  responses	  were	  either	  left	  blank	  or	  contained	  answers	  that	  were	  very	  pleasant,	  yet	  unhelpful	  for	  this	  project.	  Discarded	  responses	  include	  those	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “Peace	  is	  beautiful,”	  “Peace	  is	  very	  good.”	  These	  descriptions	  were	  deemed	  as	  analogies	  that,	  while	  nice	  sounding,	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  respondent	  frames	  peace.	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universities.	  	  I	  have	  labeled	  the	  frames	  that	  I	  identified	  as:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
Equality,	  Freedom	  and	  Liberation,	  End	  of	  Fighting,	  and	  Loss	  or	  Concession.	  	  Out	  of	  the	  total	  surveys	  that	  were	  evaluated	  for	  different	  peace	  frames,	  29.5%	  of	  respondents	  fell	  into	  the	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Equality	  Frame,	  19%	  into	  the	  Freedom	  and	  Liberation	  Frame,	  29%	  into	  the	  End	  of	  Fighting	  Frame,	  and	  the	  remaining	  29.5%	  Loss	  or	  Concession	  Frame	  [See	  figure	  4.3].	  	  Female	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  rights	  and	  equality	  frame	  or	  the	  end	  of	  violence	  group,	  while	  male	  respondents	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group	  or	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group.	  
	  	   These	  framing	  categories	  are	  by	  no	  means	  perfect.	  	  It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  participants,	  if	  presented	  with	  these	  four	  frames	  as	  options,	  would	  agree	  with	  more	  than	  one	  of	  the	  categories.	  	  However,	  inviting	  participants	  to	  write	  their	  own	  definition,	  the	  results	  indicate	  the	  more	  dominant	  frames	  because	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  definition	  that	  each	  participant	  provided	  represents	  their	  best	  conception	  of	  peace.	  	  Further,	  separating	  responses	  into	  similar	  categories	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  about	  the	  correlations	  between	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  respondents	  frame	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peace	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  believe	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  possible,	  desire	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  and	  support	  different	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	   Before	  the	  four	  peace	  frames	  are	  analyzed	  based	  on	  how	  likely	  and	  desirable	  respondents	  find	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  I	  will	  present	  the	  results	  from	  all	  respondents	  based	  on	  perceived	  likelihood	  of,	  and	  desire	  for,	  peace.	  	  Regarding	  the	  likelihood	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  41%	  of	  participants	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  impossible,	  21%	  very	  unlikely,	  25%	  unlikely,	  12%	  likely,	  and	  1%	  very	  likely	  [See	  figure	  4.4].	  	  Similarly,	  when	  ask	  how	  desirable	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is,	  45%	  indicate	  that	  it	  is	  very	  undesirable,	  13%	  moderately	  undesirable,	  18%	  neutral,	  13%	  moderately	  desirable,	  and	  11%	  very	  desirable	  [See	  figure	  4.5].	  
	   	  	   	  From	  just	  these	  two	  data	  series,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  young	  Palestinians	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  either	  likely	  or	  desirable.	  	  This	  idea	  itself	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  pessimism	  and	  skepticism.	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  four	  categories	  of	  peace	  frames	  and	  their	  distinguishing	  features,	  followed	  by	  a	  description	  of	  how	  the	  members	  of	  each	  of	  the	  frame	  groups	  compare	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to	  members	  of	  other	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  the	  total	  sample	  in	  terms	  of	  perceived	  likelihood	  and	  desirability	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  
Peace	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  equality	  	   This	  first	  group	  consists	  of	  respondents	  who	  included	  in	  their	  definition	  of	  peace	  a	  requirement	  of	  rights,	  equality,	  and/or	  respect	  for	  diversity.	  	  Responses	  in	  this	  group	  tended	  to	  approach	  peace	  as	  a	  state	  of	  being	  that	  involves	  universal	  respect	  for	  differences	  and	  an	  absence	  of	  racial	  or	  religious	  discrimination.	  	  For	  those	  in	  this	  category,	  peace	  was	  framed	  as	  a	  condition	  that	  exists	  when	  all	  people	  are	  safe,	  secure,	  and	  treated	  equally	  without	  preference	  for	  race	  or	  religion.	  	  Participants	  in	  group	  interviews	  corroborated	  the	  prevalence	  of	  this	  frame.	  	  In	  each	  interview	  there	  were	  participants	  who	  mentioned	  issues	  of	  inequality	  and	  rights	  violations.	  	  One	  young	  woman	  summed	  this	  view	  up	  very	  well	  by	  passionately	  stating,	  “Of	  course	  we	  want	  peace.	  We	  need	  peace.	  	  But,	  we	  do	  not	  think	  peace	  can	  happen	  with	  [separation]	  walls,	  division	  of	  our	  people,	  checkpoints,	  and	  regulations	  that	  do	  not	  let	  us	  worship	  where	  we	  want	  or	  develop	  our	  economy…”	  Peace	  framed	  this	  way	  demands	  high	  levels	  of	  equality	  and	  fair	  treatment	  for	  all	  people,	  and	  appears	  to	  stem	  from	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  rights	  violations	  against	  the	  Palestinians	  by	  Israelis.	  	   Of	  the	  total	  population	  sampled,	  29.5%	  were	  placed	  this	  group.	  	  Of	  participants	  in	  the	  group,	  59%	  were	  female	  and	  41%	  were	  male.	  	  What	  asked	  how	  likely	  they	  believed	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be,	  41%	  answered	  impossible,	  26%	  very	  unlikely,	  10%	  unlikely,	  23%	  likely,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  they	  believed	  peace	  to	  be	  very	  likely	  [See	  figure	  4.6].	  	  When	  compared	  to	  the	  responses	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from	  the	  entire	  sample,	  the	  same	  proportion	  of	  respondents	  in	  this	  frame	  understand	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  impossible,	  while	  a	  smaller	  percentage	  indicate	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  and	  a	  higher	  percentage	  think	  that	  is	  likely.	  Similarly,	  of	  respondents	  placed	  in	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  equality	  group,	  55%	  answered	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  either	  very	  undesirable	  or	  moderately	  undesirable,	  compared	  with	  26%	  of	  respondents	  that	  found	  peace	  with	  Israel	  either	  very	  desirable	  or	  moderately	  desirable,	  while	  the	  remaining	  19%	  claimed	  neutrality	  on	  the	  issue	  [See	  figure	  4.7].	  	  These	  responses	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  total	  sample,	  only	  varying	  a	  few	  percentage	  points	  in	  each	  category.	  
	  	  	   	  
Peace	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  	   Another	  category	  of	  peace	  framing	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  survey	  responses	  is	  identifiable	  by	  an	  insistence	  on	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  peace.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  peace	  demands	  an	  active	  shaking	  off	  of	  any	  and	  all	  oppression	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  any	  oppressive	  systems.	  	  This	  frame	  is	  fairly	  similar	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  equality	  frame	  discussed	  above,	  but	  it	  is	  unique	  in	  its	  primary	  focus	  on	  sovereignty	  and	  independence.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group’s	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responses	  included	  statements	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  ending	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  of	  Palestinian	  lands,	  the	  establishment	  of	  self-­‐rule	  that	  is	  free	  from	  international	  intervention,	  and	  returning	  land	  to	  Palestinian	  control.	  	  Several	  interviewees	  alluded	  to	  the	  demand	  that	  injustices	  be	  corrected	  before	  any	  talk	  of	  peace	  is	  had.	  12	  	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  general	  agreement	  in	  each	  group	  interview	  that	  peace	  was	  desirable,	  but	  that	  peacebuilding	  should	  not	  be	  the	  focus	  until	  the	  Palestinian	  goals	  of	  liberation	  had	  been	  accomplished.	  	  In	  six	  of	  the	  twelve	  group	  interviews,	  at	  least	  one	  interviewee	  discussed	  their	  displeasure	  with	  different	  peacebuilding	  projects,	  especially	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  joint	  projects	  that	  focused	  on	  coexistence,	  dialogue,	  and	  collaboration	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  tools	  that	  normalize	  the	  Israeli	  occupation,	  thus	  reinforcing	  the	  oppressive	  system.	  	  Framed	  this	  way,	  peace	  is	  good	  and	  should	  be	  desired,	  but	  not	  until	  freedom	  and	  justice	  is	  attained.	  	   Of	  all	  participants,	  19%	  were	  placed	  in	  this	  group.	  	  Of	  the	  respondents	  placed	  in	  this	  group,	  62%	  were	  male	  and	  38%	  female.	  	  Respondents	  in	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group	  were	  noticeably	  less	  optimistic	  than	  the	  total	  sample	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  46%	  of	  respondents	  answered	  that	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  impossible,	  8%	  very	  unlikely,	  35%	  unlikely,	  11%	  likely,	  and	  no	  participants	  indicated	  that	  they	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  very	  likely	  [see	  figure	  4.8].	  	  Participants	  that	  were	  placed	  in	  this	  category	  were	  5%	  more	  likely	  to	  find	  eventual	  peace	  impossible	  and	  showed	  slightly	  less	  of	  a	  tendency	  to	  believe	  that	  peace	  is	  likely.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Responses	  concerned	  with	  ending	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  become	  very	  hard	  to	  analyze	  because	  it	  relies	  on	  a	  very	  subjective	  understanding	  of	  what	  lands	  are	  actually	  occupied.	  	  Many	  interview	  participants	  wanted	  to	  make	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  they	  considered	  all	  parts	  of	  historic	  Palestine	  to	  be	  under	  Israeli	  occupation,	  while	  others	  consider	  only	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip	  to	  be	  occupied.	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   Participants’	  desire	  for	  peace,	  when	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  freedom	  and	  liberation,	  was	  almost	  identical	  to	  the	  total	  sample.	  	  Of	  participants	  that	  emphasized	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  in	  their	  definition	  of	  peace	  60%	  indicated	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  either	  very	  undesirable	  or	  moderately	  undesirable,	  while	  24%	  found	  it	  very	  desirable	  or	  moderately	  desirable	  [see	  figure	  4.9].	  
	  	  	   	  
Peace	  as	  an	  end	  to	  fighting	  Anther	  significant	  group	  of	  participants	  appeared	  to	  frame	  peace	  as	  simply	  an	  end	  to	  fighting.	  	  In	  the	  surveys,	  participants	  that	  were	  placed	  into	  this	  group	  defined	  peace	  as	  an	  end	  to	  hostilities,	  or	  a	  cessation	  of	  violent	  activity.	  	  Those	  that	  described	  peace	  as	  an	  end	  to	  fighting	  or	  hostility	  focused	  on	  direct	  violence,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  systemic	  forms	  of	  violence	  such	  as	  racial	  or	  religious	  discrimination.	  	  Participants	  in	  the	  end	  of	  violence	  group	  also	  highlighted	  issues	  of	  land	  appropriation	  as	  violence,	  especially	  in	  respect	  to	  Israeli	  settlement	  activity.	  	  	  	   Of	  the	  total	  sample,	  22%	  defined	  peace	  as	  a	  cessation	  of	  fighting	  or	  hostilities,	  and	  the	  survey	  results	  for	  the	  likeliness	  of,	  and	  desire	  for,	  peace	  with	  Israel	  are	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  survey.	  	  Sixty	  percent	  of	  respondents	  in	  this	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group	  were	  female	  and	  40%	  male.	  	  Of	  respondents	  who	  frame	  peace	  as	  simply	  an	  end	  to	  fighting,	  35%	  indicated	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  impossible,	  21%	  very	  unlikely,	  37%	  unlikely,	  5%	  likely,	  and	  2%	  very	  likely	  [see	  figure	  4.10].	  	  Participants	  applying	  this	  frame	  to	  peace	  with	  Israel	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  peace	  is	  a	  possibility,	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  indicate	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  impossible	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  participants.	  	   While	  only	  7%	  of	  respondents	  that	  frame	  peace	  as	  an	  end	  to	  hostilities	  and	  violence	  believed	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  either	  likely	  or	  very	  likely,	  9%	  identified	  it	  as	  very	  desirable,	  26%	  moderately	  desirable,	  14%	  moderately	  undesirable,	  39%	  very	  undesirable,	  and	  12%	  claim	  neutrality	  [see	  figure	  4.11].	  	  Compared	  to	  the	  entire	  population	  surveyed,	  the	  group	  that	  framed	  peace	  as	  an	  end	  to	  violence	  and	  hostilities	  exhibited	  a	  significantly	  stronger	  desire	  for	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  slightly	  lower	  tendency	  toward	  finding	  peace	  undesirable.	  
	  	  	   	  
Peace	  as	  a	  loss	  or	  concession	  	   The	  previous	  peace	  frames	  that	  I	  discussed	  were	  fairly	  easy	  to	  categorize,	  and,	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  share	  some	  common	  characteristics	  with	  each	  other.	  	  The	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loss	  or	  concession	  frame	  of	  peace	  stands	  out	  as,	  perhaps,	  the	  most	  unique	  and	  provacative	  of	  the	  frames	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  data.	  	  To	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  respondents,	  peace	  has	  developed	  an	  entirely	  negative	  connotation.	  	  To	  those	  in	  this	  group,	  peace	  has	  become	  equivalent	  to	  surrender	  and	  admission	  of	  defeat.	  	  Respondents	  that	  frame	  peace	  as	  a	  concession	  emphasized	  the	  notion	  that	  to	  make	  peace	  with	  Israel	  would	  be	  to	  give	  up	  land	  and	  rights	  with	  nothing	  in	  return.	  	  Interviewees	  highlighted	  a	  few	  basic	  roots	  of	  this	  frame.	  	  First,	  many	  interviewees	  discussed	  past	  peace	  agreements	  with	  Israel,	  most	  notably	  the	  Oslo	  Accords,	  as	  proof	  that	  Israel	  has	  no	  intention	  of	  making	  peace	  with	  Palestine.	  	  They	  exhibited	  a	  paralyzing	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  Israeli	  policy	  makers	  to	  implement	  a	  peace	  deal,	  and	  they	  were	  adament	  that	  Israel	  and	  Israelis	  reject	  any	  notion	  of	  peace.	  	  Second,	  many	  participants	  argued	  that	  to	  make	  peace	  would	  be	  to	  give	  up	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  nonegotiable	  rights.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  making	  peace	  with	  Israel	  would	  surrender	  both	  Palestinian	  land	  and	  the	  right	  of	  return	  for	  Palestinian	  refugees.	  Finally,	  many	  interviewees	  indicated	  that	  peace	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  is	  something	  that	  is	  trying	  to	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  Palestinians,	  primarly	  by	  the	  West.	  	   Participants	  that	  defined	  peace	  as	  a	  loss	  or	  concession	  constituted	  29.5%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  surveyed,	  making	  it	  equivalent	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  equality	  group,	  as	  the	  most	  prevelent	  frame	  identified	  in	  this	  study.	  	  Of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  group,	  57%	  were	  male	  and	  47%	  were	  female.	  	  Of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group,	  55%	  believed	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  impossible,	  21%	  very	  unlikely,	  10%	  unlikely,	  12%	  likely	  and	  2%	  very	  likely	  [see	  figure	  4.12].	  	  Compared	  to	  the	  total	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sample,	  people	  who	  frame	  peace	  as	  a	  concession	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  think	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  impossible.	  	   Because	  of	  the	  negative	  nature	  of	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  frame,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  would	  be	  comletely	  undesirable	  for	  participants	  placed	  in	  this	  group.	  	  Not	  suprisingly,	  a	  higher	  percentage,	  62%,	  indicated	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  very	  undesirable	  and	  9%	  answered	  moderately	  undesirable.	  	  What	  is	  surprising	  is	  that	  any	  participant	  that	  framed	  peace	  as	  a	  loss	  or	  concession,	  given	  its	  disposition	  and	  reliance	  on	  peace	  equalling	  defeat,	  would	  consider	  it	  desirable.	  	  However,	  10%	  of	  respondents	  found	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  very	  desirable,	  3%	  moderately	  desirable,	  and	  another	  16%	  claimed	  to	  be	  neutral	  on	  the	  issue	  [see	  figure	  4.13].	  	  While	  it	  is	  suprising	  that	  any	  of	  the	  respondents	  that	  frame	  peace	  negatively	  would	  desire	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  this	  group	  showed	  entirely	  less	  desire	  for	  peace	  with	  Israel	  than	  the	  other	  three	  groups	  identified	  above.	  	  
	  	  	   	  	   The	  following	  tables	  [table	  4.1	  and	  table	  4.2]	  illustrate	  how	  members	  of	  the	  different	  peace	  frame	  groups	  answered	  the	  questions	  regarding	  the	  perceived	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likeliness	  and	  desire	  for	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  The	  tables	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  once	  again	  that	  there	  is	  very	  little	  hope	  or	  desire	  for	  peace	  amongst	  respondents.	  





0%	   23%	   10%	   26%	   41%	  
Freedom	  and	  
Liberation	  
0%	   11%	   35%	   8%	   46%	  
No	  Violence	   2%	   5%	   37%	   21%	   35%	  
Loss	  or	  
Concession	  
2%	   12%	   10%	   21%	   55%	  	  
Total	   1%	   12%	   25%	   21%	   41%	  
	  
Table	  4.2.	  Frame	  Group	  Comparisons:	  Desire	  for	  Peace	  with	  Israel	  	   Very	  
Desirable	  




12%	   14%	   19%	   12%	   43%	  
Freedom	  and	  
Liberation	  
11%	   13%	   16%	   14%	   46%	  
No	  Violence	   9%	   26%	   12%	   14%	   39%	  
Loss	  or	  
Concession	  
10%	   3%	   16%	   9%	   62%	  
Total	   11%	   13%	   18%	   13%	   45%	  
	  
Framing	  Violence	  and	  Armed	  Struggle	  	   My	  second	  goal	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  thorough	  discription	  of	  how	  Palestinians	  think	  about	  issues	  of	  armed	  struggle	  and	  violence.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  survey	  was	  designed	  to	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  each	  respondent	  understands	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  and	  fighting	  as	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  special	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  variations	  in	  answers	  between	  the	  different	  peace	  frame	  categories	  discussed	  above.	  	   As	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  Palestinians	  frame	  violence	  as	  something	  that	  should	  only	  be	  used	  in	  cases	  of	  self-­‐defense	  and	  as	  a	  last	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resort	  [See	  figures	  4.1	  and	  4.2].	  	  Survey	  responses	  showed	  an	  overwhelming	  support	  for	  armed	  resistance	  as	  a	  conflict	  strategy.	  	  However,	  these	  tendencies,	  coupled	  with	  the	  figures	  shared	  earlier	  showing	  that	  respondents	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  violence	  should	  be	  reserved	  for	  either	  a	  last	  resort,	  or	  in	  self-­‐defense,	  allows	  for	  a	  very	  interesting	  and	  important	  conversation.	  	  	   When	  prompted	  with	  the	  statement,	  “The	  Palestinian	  Authority	  should	  support	  militant	  action	  against	  Israel,”	  only	  7%	  indicated	  that	  they	  disagree,	  while	  37%	  marked	  that	  they	  agree	  and	  40%	  strongly	  agree,	  while	  16%	  answered	  neutral	  [See	  figure	  4.16].	  	  In	  other	  words,	  over	  three	  quarters	  of	  respondents	  wish	  that	  the	  governing	  Palestinian	  body	  would	  take	  a	  more	  direct	  and	  active	  role	  in	  Palestinian	  armed	  resistance.	  	   The	  prompt,	  “Armed	  struggle	  should	  be	  used	  as	  a	  resistance	  strategy,”	  was	  comparably	  received.	  	  For	  this	  prompt,	  3%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  they	  strongly	  disagree,	  13%	  disagree,	  32%	  agree,	  34%	  strongly	  agree,	  and	  the	  final	  18%	  claimed	  neutrality	  [See	  figure	  4.17].	  	  Taken	  together	  with	  the	  previous	  statistic,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  very	  strong	  support	  by	  Palestinian	  students	  to	  engage	  in	  armed	  struggle	  agains	  the	  Israeli	  occupation.	  
	   59	  
	  	  	   	  	   The	  significant	  support	  for	  armed	  struggle	  combined	  with	  the	  strong	  notion	  that	  violence	  should	  be	  used	  only	  in	  self-­‐defense	  and	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  implies	  that	  most	  of	  the	  participants	  believed	  that	  to	  engage	  in	  violent	  activity	  would	  be	  an	  act	  of	  self	  defense,	  and	  that	  no	  other	  interventions	  are	  currently	  viable.	  	  These	  notions	  were	  heavily	  supported	  in	  the	  group	  interviews.	  	  One	  interviewee	  summarized	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  dominant	  undestanding	  of	  violent	  resistance	  in	  saying,	  “We	  need	  to	  keep	  all	  options	  open	  for	  resistance.	  	  Sometimes	  we	  should	  do	  marches,	  boycotts,	  or	  other	  demonstrations,	  but	  if	  those	  do	  not	  work,	  we	  need	  to	  try	  other	  methods,	  including	  fighting.”	  	   Interviewees	  frequently	  discussed	  past	  examples	  of	  nonviolent	  conflict	  engagement	  when	  expressing	  their	  support	  for	  armed	  engagement.	  	  The	  dominant	  perception	  in	  each	  interview	  group	  was	  that	  most	  interventions	  have	  been	  tried,	  and	  have	  all	  produced	  similar	  results.	  	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  general	  agreement	  that	  nonviolent	  resistance	  has	  been	  tried,	  and	  did	  not	  work.	  	  The	  respondents	  gave	  extra	  attention	  to	  the	  strikes,	  boycotts,	  and	  demonstrations	  of	  the	  first	  Intifada,	  which	  was	  winding	  down	  about	  the	  time	  that	  most	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  born,	  as	  an	  example	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of	  a	  time	  when	  nonviolent	  resistance	  was	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  resistance.	  	  Because	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  Intifada	  did	  not	  produce	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  occupation	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  persists	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  is	  becoming	  more	  extreme,	  interviewees	  simply	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  nonviolent	  movements	  will	  be	  effective.	  	   In	  reference	  to	  reserving	  violence	  for	  defensive	  purposes,	  interviewees	  tended	  to	  take	  a	  very	  broad	  view	  of	  violence.	  	  For	  example,	  most	  participants	  agreed	  that	  Israeli	  settlements	  and	  land	  appropriations	  are	  violent	  acts,	  as	  well	  as	  Israeli	  policies	  that	  interfere	  with	  economic	  development	  and	  Palestinian	  soveriegnty.	  	  These	  points	  were	  highly	  contentious	  and	  carefully	  debated	  in	  most	  of	  the	  group	  interviews.	  	  Debates	  were	  not	  necessarily	  concerned	  with	  whether	  or	  not	  actions	  such	  as	  land	  appropriations	  and	  debilitating	  policies	  were	  violent,	  as	  much	  as	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  warranted	  violent	  responses.	  	  	  It	  appeared	  that	  a	  slight	  majority	  supported	  armed	  responses,	  but	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  interviewees	  in	  disagreement.	  	   The	  final	  issue	  that	  I	  explored	  concerns	  to	  whom	  violent	  activity	  should	  be	  directed.	  	  Respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  respond	  to	  statements	  about	  support	  for	  violence	  against	  Israeli	  soldiers,	  Israelis	  living	  on	  lands	  occupied	  after	  the	  1967	  war-­‐	  or	  settlers,	  and	  all	  Israelis.	  	  In	  respect	  to	  violence	  against	  Israeli	  soldiers,	  53%	  indicated	  that	  they	  strongly	  agree,	  32%	  agree,	  2%	  disagree,	  1%	  strongly	  disagree,	  and	  12%	  selected	  neutral	  [see	  figure	  4.18].	  	  When	  the	  direction	  of	  violence	  is	  shifted	  to	  settlers	  in	  areas	  occupied	  after	  the	  1967	  war,	  the	  results	  changed	  significantly:	  37%	  indicated	  that	  they	  strongly	  agree,	  36%	  agree,	  6%	  disagree,	  1%	  strongly	  disagree,	  and	  20%	  claim	  neutrality	  [see	  figure	  4.19].	  	  Finally,	  when	  the	  violence	  is	  
	   61	  
directed	  at	  all	  Israelis,	  30%	  strongly	  agreed,	  15%	  agreed,	  26%	  disagreed,	  and	  6%	  strongly	  disagreed,	  while	  23%	  were	  neutral	  [see	  figure	  4.20].	  
	  	  	   	  
	  	   The	  most	  interesting	  of	  these	  data	  sets	  is	  the	  one	  inquiring	  about	  violence	  against	  all	  Israelis,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  group	  interviews.	  	  In	  the	  group	  interviews,	  there	  existed	  a	  near	  consensus	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  against	  soldiers,	  largely	  based	  on	  negative	  experiences	  with	  Israeli	  soldiers	  in	  their	  daily	  lives.	  	  Further,	  most	  people	  agreed	  that	  it	  is	  justified	  and	  necessary	  to	  forcefully	  resist	  existing	  and	  expanding	  settlement	  activity	  in	  the	  West	  Bank,	  though	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  interviewees	  dissented	  because,	  regardless	  of	  the	  disgracefulness	  of	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settlement	  activity,	  they	  understood	  attacking	  civilians	  as	  unacceptable.	  	  However,	  the	  general	  notion	  was	  that	  settlement	  activity	  is	  violent,	  and	  as	  an	  act	  of	  defense,	  Palestinians	  can	  respond	  violently.	  	  When	  the	  conversations	  switched	  to	  violence	  against	  all	  Israelis,	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  majority	  did	  not	  support	  violence.	  	  The	  major	  reasons	  given	  against	  violence	  in	  Israel	  centered	  on	  the	  chance	  of	  hurting	  civilians	  and	  children,	  and	  a	  sense	  that	  such	  efforts	  would	  not	  be	  helpful	  or	  successful.	  	   While	  there	  is	  support	  for	  violence	  against	  all	  Israelis,	  it	  should	  be	  observed	  that	  it	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  other	  two	  categories.	  	  Further,	  almost	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  respondents	  claimed	  to	  be	  neutral	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  those	  individuals	  would	  have	  responded	  if	  “neutral”	  would	  not	  have	  been	  an	  option.	  	  This	  notion	  will	  be	  further	  tempered	  in	  the	  next	  section	  when	  I	  discuss	  there	  interaction	  between	  the	  peace	  frames	  and	  violence	  frames.	  
Peace	  Frames	  and	  Violence	  
	   In	  order	  to	  more	  thoroughly	  explore	  the	  way	  that	  violence	  is	  framed	  by	  students	  in	  Palestinian	  univerisities,	  I	  analyzed	  the	  support	  for	  different	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  methods	  based	  on	  the	  peace	  frame	  categories	  identified	  above.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  four	  peace	  frames	  identified	  above	  and	  support	  for	  armed	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  analysis	  based	  on	  peace	  framing	  categories	  did	  not	  make	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  violence.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  all	  four	  frames	  fell	  within	  a	  few	  percentage	  points	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  total	  sample.	  	  However,	  a	  few	  interesting	  trends	  emerged	  from	  the	  division.	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   The	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group,	  which	  is	  the	  one	  that	  is	  identifiable	  by	  an	  emphasis	  on	  soveignty	  and	  self-­‐determination	  as	  prerequisite	  to	  peace,	  differed	  from	  the	  other	  groups	  in	  two	  of	  the	  categories	  related	  to	  violent	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  First,	  participants	  in	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group	  show	  greater	  support	  for	  reserving	  violence	  for	  defensive	  purposes.	  	  Of	  the	  respondents	  in	  this	  category,	  74%	  indicated	  that	  they	  either	  strongly	  agree,	  or	  agree	  with	  this	  notion,	  compared	  to	  the	  total	  sample,	  in	  which	  53%	  either	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed.	  	  The	  other	  three	  peace	  framing	  categories	  all	  fall	  within	  5%	  of	  the	  total.	  	  Second,	  those	  who	  frame	  peace	  in	  terms	  of	  freedom	  and	  liberation,	  indicate	  that	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  should	  support	  militant	  action.	  	  To	  this	  prompt,	  86%	  of	  people	  in	  this	  category,	  compared	  with	  77%	  of	  all	  respondents,	  agree	  or	  strongly	  agree.	  	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  this	  combination	  or	  a	  high	  desire	  for	  violent	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies	  coupled	  with	  a	  belief	  that	  violence	  should	  only	  be	  used	  for	  defensive	  purposes	  indicates	  that	  the	  respondents	  believe	  that	  armed	  struggle	  today	  would	  be	  a	  defensive	  action,	  and	  therefore	  justifiable.	  	   The	  only	  significant	  variation	  in	  the	  responses	  from	  the	  different	  groups	  had	  to	  do	  with	  to	  whom	  violent	  action	  is	  directed.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  violence	  against	  soldiers,	  compared	  to	  the	  85%	  of	  all	  respondents	  that	  either	  agreed,	  or	  strongly	  agreed,	  all	  four	  of	  the	  groups	  are	  within	  three	  percentage	  points.	  	  More	  variation	  begins	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  next	  two	  categories.	  	  The	  loss	  or	  concession	  group,	  which	  is	  identifiable	  by	  its	  view	  of	  peace	  as	  very	  undesirable,	  shows	  much	  stronger	  support	  for	  violence	  against	  Israelis	  in	  lands	  occupied	  by	  Israel	  after	  the	  1967	  war,	  and	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against	  all	  Israelis,	  while	  the	  other	  three	  framing	  groups	  remain	  closely	  alligned	  and	  more	  opposed	  to	  these	  types	  of	  violence.	  	  Seventy-­‐seven	  percent	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group	  indicated	  that	  they	  agree	  or	  strongly	  agree	  with	  using	  violent	  tactics	  against	  Israeli	  settlers,	  while	  only	  71%	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  other	  categories	  answered	  the	  same	  way.	  	  When	  the	  topic	  is	  all	  Israelis,	  58%	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group,	  compared	  to	  43%	  or	  less	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  other	  groups,	  slected	  agree	  or	  strongly	  agree.	  
Views	  on	  the	  Two-­‐State	  Solution	  	   While	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  to	  endorse	  or	  promote	  one	  final	  solution	  over	  the	  others,	  a	  major	  part	  of	  the	  survey	  inquired	  as	  to	  the	  respondents	  perceptions	  of	  peace	  in	  relation	  to	  different	  potential	  end	  results	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  Survey	  respondents	  were	  provided	  with	  a	  hypothetical	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  would	  be	  formed	  based	  on	  the	  pre-­‐1967	  borders	  with	  East	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  capital.	  	  Based	  on	  this	  scenario,	  participants	  were	  asked	  how	  likely	  they	  believe	  it	  to	  be,	  how	  desirable	  it	  would	  be	  to	  them,	  and	  the	  effects	  that	  it	  would	  have	  on	  peace	  between	  Palestine	  and	  Israel.	  	   When	  asked	  how	  likely	  they	  perceive	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution,	  5%	  answered	  very	  likely,	  33%	  likely,	  23%	  unlikely,	  14	  very	  unlikely,	  and	  25%	  believed	  it	  to	  be	  impossible	  [see	  figure	  4.21].	  	  When	  asked,	  given	  the	  same	  hypothetical	  scenario,	  how	  desirable	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  is,	  12%	  answered	  very	  desirable,	  28%	  desirable,	  41%	  undesirable,	  3%	  very	  undesirable,	  and	  16%	  claimed	  neutrality	  [see	  figure	  4.22].	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At	  first	  glance,	  these	  responses	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  findings	  reported	  earlier	  regarding	  perceived	  likeliness	  of,	  and	  desire	  for,	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  More	  participants	  responded	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  that	  was	  presented	  that	  were	  interested	  in	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  However,	  when	  asked	  how	  the	  hypothetical	  proposal	  would	  affect	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  relations,	  4%	  answered	  that	  it	  would	  be	  much	  more	  peaceful,	  27%	  more	  peaceful,	  9%	  less	  peaceful,	  6%	  much	  less	  peaceful,	  while	  the	  rest,	  and	  the	  majority,	  of	  respondents	  believed	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  change	  [see	  figure	  4.23].	  	  This	  shows	  that	  while	  many	  of	  the	  respondents	  desired	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution,	  they	  did	  not	  necessarily	  equate	  it	  with	  peace.	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Among	  the	  framing	  groups	  identified	  above,	  there	  was	  very	  little	  divergence	  in	  the	  perceived	  likeliness	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  two-­‐state	  proposal	  [see	  table	  4.3].	  	  However,	  there	  were	  some	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  framing	  groups	  in	  the	  expressed	  desire	  for	  the	  two-­‐state	  arrangement.	  	  The	  rights	  and	  equality	  group	  and	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group	  showed	  a	  much	  stronger	  desire	  for	  the	  two	  state	  soltution.	  	  Forty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  rights	  and	  equality	  group,	  and	  46%	  in	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  group	  indicated	  that	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  was	  either	  very	  desirable	  or	  desirable,	  compared	  to	  36%	  from	  the	  end	  of	  violence	  group	  and	  29%	  from	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group.	  	  Further,	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group,	  57%	  answered	  either	  undesirable	  or	  very	  undesirable	  [see	  table	  4.4].	  	  Regarding	  the	  perceived	  effects	  that	  the	  two-­‐state	  arrangement	  would	  have	  on	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  peace,	  all	  groups	  largely	  indicated	  that	  they	  perceived	  such	  a	  solution	  to	  provide	  no	  change.	  	  The	  rights	  and	  equality	  group	  was	  most	  likely	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  two-­‐state	  option	  would	  increase	  the	  peacefulness	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  From	  this	  group,	  36%	  answered	  that	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  would	  make	  the	  relationship	  either	  much	  more	  peaceful	  or	  more	  peaceful.	  	  The	  loss	  or	  concession	  group	  held	  the	  lowest	  opinion	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  two-­‐state	  option.	  	  Of	  participants	  placed	  in	  this	  group,	  none	  of	  the	  respondents	  answered	  that	  the	  relationship	  would	  be	  much	  more	  peaceful,	  and	  20%	  answered	  more	  peaceful	  [see	  table	  4.5].	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Table	  4.3.	  Frame	  Group	  Comparisons:	  Likeliness	  of	  Two	  State	  Solution	  	   Very	  Likely	   Likely	   Unlikely	   Very	  Unlikely	   Impossible	  
Rights	  and	  
Equality	  
3%	   31%	   24%	   16%	   26%	  
Freedom	  and	  
Liberation	  
3%	   30%	   32%	   13%	   22%	  
No	  Violence	   5%	   26%	   30%	   23%	   16%	  
Loss	  or	  
Concession	  
7%	   31%	   23%	   10%	   29%	  	  
Total	   5%	   33%	   23%	   14%	   25%	  	  
Table	  4.4.	  Frame	  Group	  Comparisons:	  Desire	  for	  Two	  State	  Solution	  	   Very	  
Desirable	  




12%	   33%	   20%	   33%	   2%	  
Freedom	  and	  
Liberation	  
8%	   38%	   8%	   38%	   8%	  
No	  Violence	   9%	   28%	   16%	   44%	   3%	  
Loss	  or	  
Concession	  
7%	   22%	   14%	   54%	   3%	  
Total	   12%	   28%	   16%	   41%	   3%	  	  
Table	  4.5.	  Frame	  Comparisons:	  Results	  of	  Two	  State	  Solution	  	   Much	  more	  
peaceful	  




5%	   31%	   54%	   7%	   3%	  
Freedom	  and	  
liberation	  
3%	   27%	   62%	   3%	   5%	  
No	  Violence	   5%	   23%	   54%	   9%	   9%	  
Loss	  or	  
Concession	  
0%	   20%	   66%	   9%	   5%	  
Total	   4%	   27%	   54%	   9%	   6%	  	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  reported	  the	  data	  and	  described	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  can	  it	  was	  broken	  down.	  	  I	  introduced	  and	  described	  the	  four	  groups	  that	  I	  identified,	  rights	  and	  equality,	  freedom	  and	  liberation,	  end	  of	  violence,	  and	  loss	  or	  concession	  based	  on	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  participants	  defined	  peace.	  	  These	  groups	  were	  then	  analyzed	  based	  on	  propensity	  towards	  peace	  and	  desire	  for	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	  The	  next,	  and	  final,	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  dedicated	  to	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  the	  data	  may	  imply	  and	  how	  it	  may	  be	  interpreted.	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CHAPTER	  V	  
DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
	  	   In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  presented	  the	  data	  collected	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  the	  material,	  draw	  conclusions,	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  conclusions,	  and	  suggest	  areas	  in	  which	  more	  research	  is	  necessary.	  	  	  One	  clear	  finding	  is	  that,	  although	  respondents	  generally	  view	  peace	  positively,	  they	  view	  it	  negatively	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  Of	  the	  four	  peace	  frames	  that	  I	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  freedom	  and	  liberation,	  equality	  and	  human	  rights,	  end	  of	  violence,	  and	  loss	  or	  concession,	  the	  first	  three	  relate	  to	  the	  different	  elements	  of	  just	  or	  positive	  peace	  as	  described	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  	  Based	  on	  their	  survey	  responses,	  70%	  of	  participants	  framed	  peace	  in	  a	  way	  that	  corresponds	  with	  one	  of	  these	  three	  groups.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  groups	  come	  very	  close	  to	  Galtung’s	  (1969)	  idea	  of	  positive	  peace,	  which	  asserts	  that	  human	  rights,	  equality,	  and	  freedom	  must	  accompany	  an	  end	  to	  direct	  violence	  for	  true	  peace	  to	  exist.	  	  	  	   The	  general	  understanding	  of	  peace	  as	  positive,	  however,	  can	  only	  be	  carried	  so	  far.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  framing	  categories,	  when	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict,	  respondents	  did	  not	  view	  peace	  favorably.	  	  There	  exists	  in	  the	  data	  an	  overwhelming	  sense	  of	  pessimism	  and	  hostility	  towards	  the	  idea	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  respondents	  believed	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  unlikely,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  and	  very	  few	  respondents	  found	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  desirable.	  Much	  of	  the	  literature	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  II	  helps	  to	  explain	  this	  divergence.	  	  One	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  the	  failure	  of	  past	  attempts	  
	   69	  
to	  resolve	  the	  conflict.	  Bar-­‐Tal	  and	  Rouhana	  (1998)	  argue	  that	  parties	  to	  intractable	  conflict	  become	  more	  polarized	  the	  longer	  the	  conflict	  persists.	  	  Similarly,	  Lederach	  (2005)	  suggests	  that	  failed	  attempts	  at	  peacebuilding	  influence	  parties	  to	  become	  less	  hopeful	  and	  more	  pessimistic	  about	  peace.	  	  Since	  1994,	  when	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  were	  signed,	  there	  have	  been	  several	  attempts	  by	  Palestinian	  and	  Israeli	  officials	  to	  come	  to	  a	  final	  agreement.	  	  Now,	  almost	  twenty	  years	  later,	  there	  has	  been	  very	  little,	  if	  any,	  progress	  on	  final	  status	  issues.	  	  Further,	  each	  failed	  series	  of	  negotiations	  has	  left	  Palestinians	  increasingly	  skeptical	  about	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  (Sahliyeh	  &	  Deng,	  2003).	  	  Overwhelmingly,	  the	  respondents	  showed	  little	  to	  no	  faith	  in	  Israeli	  or	  Palestinian	  leadership	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  that	  would	  provide	  a	  peaceful	  and	  satisfactory	  resolution.	  	  Interviewees	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  Israeli	  leaders	  have	  the	  slightest	  desire	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith.	  	   Curle	  (1971),	  Christie	  (2006),	  and	  Jacoby	  (2008)	  suggest	  that	  central	  to	  the	  perceived	  likeliness	  of	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  structural	  or	  systemic	  violence.	  	  Survey	  respondents	  and	  interviewees	  collectively	  indicated	  that	  they	  perceive	  many	  Israeli	  policies	  as	  major	  hindrances	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  peace.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  interviewee,	  “How	  are	  we	  supposed	  to	  believe	  in	  peace	  with	  someone	  who	  takes	  our	  land	  and	  will	  not	  let	  us	  build	  normal	  lives?”	  	  Israeli	  policies	  of	  land	  appropriations	  for	  settlement	  building	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  separation	  wall	  which	  stifles	  the	  Palestinian	  economy	  and	  restricts	  movement	  makes	  the	  notion	  of	  peace	  with	  Israel	  impossible	  for	  the	  respondents.	  	  Interviewees	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fear	  that	  negotiations	  conducted	  while	  these	  types	  of	  offenses	  are	  carried	  out	  will	  serve	  to	  normalize	  the	  oppressive	  structures	  in	  place.	  	   Finally,	  the	  concept	  of	  peace	  has	  largely	  become	  framed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  pacifying	  the	  Palestinians,	  instead	  of	  as	  an	  authentic	  offer	  of	  a	  holistic	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  Curle	  (1971)	  and	  Lederach	  (1998)	  both	  argue	  that	  offers	  of	  peace	  that	  are	  perceived	  by	  one	  party	  as	  less	  than	  authentic,	  or	  serving	  ulterior	  motives,	  will	  have	  very	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  As	  historic	  as	  the	  Oslo	  agreements	  may	  have	  been	  at	  the	  time,	  interviewees	  largely	  viewed	  it	  as	  a	  farce.	  	  This	  is	  simply	  another	  instance	  that	  Palestinians	  point	  to	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  Israeli	  officials	  are	  not	  serious	  about	  peace.	  	   Accompanying	  the	  growing	  notion	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  highly	  unlikely,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  is	  increasing	  support	  for	  armed	  tactics.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  respondents	  tend	  to	  frame	  violence	  as	  a	  tactic	  to	  be	  used	  under	  fairly	  strict	  parameters.	  	  The	  data	  from	  the	  survey	  shows	  that	  most	  respondents	  support	  violence	  only	  when	  it	  is	  used	  for	  self-­‐defense	  and/or	  as	  a	  last	  resort.	  	  Combined	  with	  the	  overwhelming	  support	  for	  armed	  engagement	  strategies,	  this	  indicates	  that	  Palestinians	  believe	  that	  they	  have	  reached	  an	  instance	  of	  last	  resort	  and	  that	  acting	  violently	  is	  equated	  with	  the	  defense	  of	  self	  and	  community.	  	   Moore	  and	  Jaggers	  (1990)	  argue	  that	  support	  for	  armed	  movements	  increases	  as	  individuals	  begin	  to	  perceive	  that	  they	  have	  no	  other	  viable	  option	  to	  remedy	  grievances.	  	  Both	  the	  survey	  and	  interview	  responses	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  sense	  amongst	  participants	  that	  Palestinians	  do	  not	  have	  an	  effective	  nonviolent	  option	  for	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  respondent,	  “We	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tried	  strikes,	  protests,	  and	  demonstrations,	  and	  we	  still	  have	  conflict.”	  	  Every	  interview	  group	  had	  members	  that	  talked	  extensively	  about	  the	  use	  of	  boycotts,	  strikes,	  and	  demonstrations	  from	  the	  First	  Intifada.	  	   Violence	  amongst	  respondents	  was	  spoken	  of	  as	  a	  tactic	  to	  be	  implemented	  along	  with	  all	  other	  tactics	  that	  they	  have	  at	  their	  disposal.	  	  One	  interviewee	  stated,	  “Of	  course	  we	  should	  use	  strikes,	  boycotts,	  theater,	  and	  other	  nonviolent	  methods	  of	  resistance,	  but	  sometimes	  we	  need	  to	  be	  fighters.”	  	  Respondents	  indicated	  that	  they	  believe	  that	  every	  tactic	  should	  be	  on	  the	  table	  and	  effective	  ones	  should	  be	  implemented.	  	  This	  notion	  has	  enormous	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  of	  this	  conflict.	  	  If	  Palestinians	  continue	  to	  view	  nonviolent	  resistance	  methods	  as	  largely	  ineffective	  and	  costly,	  support	  for	  armed	  resistance	  will	  increase	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  another	  armed	  intifada	  will	  only	  escalate.	  	   Support	  for	  violence	  tends	  to	  go	  up	  significantly	  when	  a	  group	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  either	  defending	  one	  of	  its	  basic	  needs	  (Burton	  1990)	  or	  has	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  aggression	  (Allred	  2000).	  	  The	  data	  shows	  that	  Palestinians	  believe	  themselves	  to	  be	  victims	  of	  several	  forms	  of	  direct	  and	  indirect	  violence.	  	  One	  respondent	  put	  it	  this	  way:	  “We	  think	  settlements,	  checkpoints,	  and	  walls	  are	  violence.	  	  If	  we	  continue	  to	  be	  humiliated	  and	  stolen	  from,	  we	  need	  to	  fight	  back.”	  	  Further,	  several	  survey	  respondents	  and	  interviewees	  quoted	  the	  popular	  catch	  phrase,	  “What	  was	  taken	  by	  force	  will	  only	  be	  returned	  with	  force.”	  	  Respondents	  exhibited	  a	  prevailing	  notion	  that	  the	  Palestinians	  are	  without	  a	  collaborative	  partner,	  and	  this	  reality	  leaves	  them	  with	  very	  few	  options.	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   At	  this	  rate,	  if	  significant	  progress	  is	  not	  made,	  there	  will	  likely	  be	  a	  third	  uprising	  at	  some	  point,	  and,	  given	  the	  newly	  shown	  military	  capabilities	  of	  the	  resistance	  group	  in	  Gaza,	  it	  could	  very	  well	  be	  longer	  and	  bloodier	  than	  the	  first	  two.	  	  Palestinians	  must	  be	  given	  authentic	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  nonviolent	  engagement	  will	  produce	  the	  desired	  results.	  	  If	  not,	  armed	  conflicts	  will	  arise	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  future	  generation	  of	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  alike.	  	   The	  escalation	  towards	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  relatively	  significant	  amount	  of	  participants	  that	  defined	  peace	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  loss	  or	  concession.	  	  About	  30%	  of	  survey	  respondents	  framed	  peace	  in	  general	  in	  negative	  terms,	  even	  outside	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  These	  participants	  make	  up	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  frame	  group	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Respondents	  in	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  group	  were,	  of	  the	  four	  groups	  identified,	  the	  most	  pessimistic	  about	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  They	  were	  also	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  use	  of	  violent	  tactics	  directed	  at	  all	  Israelis.	  	  For	  this	  group,	  a	  peace	  agreement	  would	  be	  equivalent	  to	  Palestinian	  surrender	  and	  a	  deadly	  blow	  to	  their	  national	  pride.	  	  	  The	  longer	  that	  groups	  remain	  in	  conflict	  with	  each	  other,	  the	  more	  antagonistic	  they	  become	  toward	  even	  the	  slightest	  notion	  of	  peace	  with	  their	  counterparts	  (Curle,	  1971;	  Jacoby,	  2008;	  Lederach,	  1988)	  and	  the	  more	  supportive	  they	  become	  of	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  (Staub,	  2011).	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  can	  reasonably	  be	  predicted	  that	  the	  Loss	  or	  Concession	  frame	  will	  continue	  to	  grow	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  three	  groups	  that	  I	  have	  identified.	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   Comments	  in	  the	  group	  interviews	  were	  much	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  peace	  is	  entirely	  negative	  than	  the	  survey	  responses	  indicated.	  	  One	  interviewee	  asked	  rhetorically,	  “What	  do	  you	  think?	  Do	  we	  give	  up?	  Do	  we	  say	  goodbye	  to	  our	  lands	  and	  Palestinian	  refugees?	  If	  that	  is	  peace,	  we	  do	  not	  want	  it.”	  	  To	  respondents	  who	  framed	  peace	  as	  a	  loss	  or	  concession,	  to	  make	  a	  peace	  agreement	  would	  be	  to	  give	  up	  their	  struggle	  and	  surrender	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  rightfully	  theirs.	  	  Framed	  this	  way,	  peace	  becomes	  completely	  unacceptable.	  Others	  believe	  that	  the	  Palestinians	  have	  already	  made	  the	  tragic	  and	  difficult	  concessions	  that	  should	  be	  required	  for	  peace.	  	  One	  interviewee	  commented,	  “We	  already	  gave	  them	  more	  than	  half	  of	  Palestine,	  but	  they	  want	  more.	  	  Our	  leaders	  gave	  up	  our	  land	  to	  make	  peace,	  and	  Israel	  used	  the	  peace	  to	  take	  more.”	  	  This	  sentiment	  aligns	  with	  Lederach’s	  (1998)	  argument	  that,	  when	  a	  group	  perceives	  a	  peace	  offer	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  obtain	  selfish	  interests	  and	  disadvantage	  their	  counterpart,	  a	  common	  response	  will	  be	  aggression	  and	  outrage	  when	  the	  motives	  become	  evident.13	  	  The	  interviewees	  believe	  that	  the	  painful	  concessions	  that	  their	  leadership	  already	  made	  have	  been	  exploited,	  leaving	  the	  idea	  of	  peace	  to	  be	  almost	  unthinkable.	  	   As	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  frame	  group	  grows,	  there	  will	  be	  more	  pressure	  on	  Palestinian	  leadership	  to	  reject	  any	  attempt	  to	  negotiate	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  to	  resume	  methods	  purely	  related	  to	  armed	  resistance.	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  resistance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  Israelis	  had	  alternative	  motives	  when	  making	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  is	  a	  highly	  debatable.	  	  There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  speculation	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  relationship	  would	  look	  different	  had	  Rabin	  not	  been	  assassinated.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Palestinians	  overwhelmingly	  believe	  that	  the	  Oslo	  process	  has	  improved	  Israel’s	  situation	  and	  harmed	  their	  own.	  	  This	  is	  detrimental	  to	  any	  lingering	  hopes	  of	  a	  peaceful	  resolution.	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movements	  in	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  have	  significantly	  increased	  their	  armed	  capabilities,	  and	  they	  are	  now	  much	  more	  able	  to	  do	  damage	  inside	  Israel	  than	  before.	  	  If	  another	  violent	  uprising	  emerges,	  at	  this	  rate	  it	  will	  be	  more	  violent	  than	  the	  previous	  intifada,	  and	  the	  Israeli	  response	  will	  likely	  be	  even	  more	  aggressive.	  	  The	  situation	  will	  be	  tragic	  and	  will	  leave	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  even	  farther	  from	  anything	  that	  resembles	  peace.	  	   In	  no	  way	  should	  the	  data	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  respondents	  are	  ideologically	  violent	  or	  opposed	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  While	  the	  survey	  data	  shows	  a	  widespread	  support	  for	  violence,	  information	  gathered	  in	  the	  group	  interviews	  pointed	  to	  relatively	  immediate	  and	  tangible	  issues	  that	  have	  led	  to	  the	  support	  for	  violent	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  None	  of	  the	  interviewees	  indicated	  that	  their	  support	  for	  armed	  resistance	  methods	  were	  informed	  by	  religious	  or	  ideological	  factors.	  	  Instead,	  interviewees	  pointed	  to	  specific	  negative	  experiences	  with	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  Israeli	  policy.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  support	  for	  violence	  amongst	  respondents	  is	  a	  strong	  reaction	  to	  perceived	  injustices	  and	  identified	  grievances	  that	  have	  not	  been	  remedied.	  	  	  	   I	  have	  stated	  multiple	  times	  that	  the	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  Israel	  has	  any	  desire	  to	  make	  what	  Palestinians	  believe	  would	  be	  a	  just	  peace	  agreement.	  	  If	  Israel	  is	  in	  fact	  willing	  to	  make	  peace	  with	  Palestine,	  then	  political	  leaders	  will	  have	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  actively	  show	  good	  faith.	  	  Interviewees	  expressed	  on	  numerous	  occasions	  that	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  Palestinians	  should	  not	  have	  to	  make	  concessions	  until	  Israeli	  leaders	  show	  that	  they	  are	  serious	  about	  peace.	  	  Some	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of	  the	  signs	  that	  interviewees	  noted	  that	  they	  would	  perceive	  as	  indication	  of	  Israeli	  authenticity	  were	  a	  cessation	  of	  settlement	  building,	  the	  release	  of	  political	  prisoners,	  more	  economic	  autonomy,	  and	  an	  easement	  of	  the	  blockade	  on	  Gaza.	  	   One	  of	  the	  primary	  reasons	  that	  parties	  opt	  for	  violent	  engagement	  strategies	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  collaborative	  partners	  (Staub,	  2011).	  	  Symbolic	  gestures	  serve	  as	  significant	  indications	  of	  willingness	  to	  collaborate.	  	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  shows	  that	  the	  population	  surveyed	  does	  not	  have	  much	  faith	  in	  Israel	  as	  a	  collaborative	  partner,	  which	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  widespread	  support	  for	  violence.	  	  Symbolic	  gestures	  can	  begin	  to	  reverse	  these	  notions.	  	  	  	   In	  Chapter	  I,	  I	  stated	  that	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  to	  promote	  or	  argue	  for	  one	  of	  the	  many	  potential	  peace	  plans,	  and	  I	  maintain	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  However,	  the	  data	  collected	  on	  potential	  solutions	  merits	  comment.	  	  A	  central	  notion	  that	  this	  thesis	  hinges	  on	  is	  that	  peace	  must	  gain	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  people	  that	  make	  the	  up	  the	  parties	  order	  to	  be	  effectively	  implemented.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  political	  solutions	  to	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  have	  focused	  primarily	  on	  some	  form	  of	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  based	  broadly	  on	  the	  1948	  armistice	  lines,	  the	  right	  of	  return	  for	  Palestinian	  refugees,	  the	  status	  of	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  desired	  capital	  of	  both	  states,	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Israeli	  settlements	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  While	  the	  prospects	  of	  any	  two-­‐state	  option	  are	  dwindling,	  the	  survey	  responses	  and	  the	  group	  interviews	  provide	  some	  interesting	  insights	  into	  the	  way	  that	  young	  Palestinians	  perceive	  such	  options.	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   Many	  of	  the	  respondents-­‐-­‐	  38%-­‐-­‐	  believe	  that	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  based	  on	  the	  1967	  borders,	  with	  East	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  Palestinian	  capital,	  is	  either	  likely	  or	  very	  likely.	  	  Similarly,	  40%	  of	  respondents	  found	  such	  a	  proposal	  either	  moderately	  desirable	  or	  very	  desirable,	  compared	  to	  44%	  that	  found	  it	  moderately	  undesirable	  or	  very	  undesirable,	  and	  the	  remaining	  16%	  claimed	  neutrality.	  	  However,	  respondents	  largely	  did	  not	  equate	  this	  proposal	  with	  peace.	  	  When	  asked	  what	  effect	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  based	  on	  the	  1967	  borders,	  with	  East	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  Palestinian	  capital	  would	  have	  on	  the	  conflict,	  54%	  answered	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  change,	  while	  31%	  answered	  that	  the	  situation	  would	  become	  much	  more	  peaceful	  or	  more	  peaceful,	  and	  15%	  said	  it	  would	  be	  less	  peaceful	  or	  much	  less	  peaceful.	  	   The	  importance	  of	  the	  data	  regarding	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  goes	  beyond	  showing	  support	  for	  or	  against	  such	  a	  political	  solution.	  The	  data	  shows	  that	  a	  political	  solution	  alone	  will	  not	  produce	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace.	  	  This	  notion,	  combined	  with	  the	  general	  skepticism	  that	  most	  peacebuilding	  initiatives	  implemented	  in	  Palestine	  are	  ineffective	  because	  they	  fail	  to	  engage	  many	  of	  the	  structural	  and	  political	  realities,	  should	  inform	  the	  design	  of	  future	  peacebuilding	  initiatives.	  	  	  
Further	  Research	  	   There	  are	  several	  issues	  suggested	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  I	  believe	  should	  be	  further	  and	  more	  deeply	  explored.	  	  A	  central	  limitation	  to	  this	  study	  is	  the	  unfortunate	  exclusion	  of	  the	  Israeli	  views	  on	  peace	  and	  violence.	  	  The	  time	  and	  resources	  allotted	  for	  my	  research	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  similar	  study	  among	  Israeli	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university	  students.	  	  A	  similar	  study	  would	  be	  helpful	  in	  identifying	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  think	  about	  these	  issues	  and	  could	  provide	  significant	  information	  for	  peacebuilding	  activities.	  	  Interestingly,	  several	  of	  the	  Palestinians	  that	  participated	  in	  the	  research	  wished	  to	  know	  how	  Israelis	  would	  respond	  to	  the	  same	  questions.	  	   Another	  potential	  limitation	  to	  this	  research	  was	  the	  relatively	  small	  sample	  size	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  older	  Palestinians.	  	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  there	  is	  variation	  between	  the	  generations	  regarding	  peace	  and	  armed	  conflict.	  	   The	  data	  collected	  for	  this	  thesis	  was	  very	  broad	  and	  relatively	  general,	  which	  led	  to	  fairly	  broad	  conclusions.	  	  Future	  studies	  should	  focus	  more	  directly	  and	  specifically	  on	  the	  many	  aspects	  that	  are	  influential	  in	  frame	  development	  for	  peace	  and	  violence.	  	  The	  data	  presented	  here	  is	  a	  good	  beginning	  for	  this	  process	  and	  allows	  for	  tentative	  conclusions	  to	  be	  drawn.	  	  However	  to	  get	  a	  more	  accurate	  and	  specific	  understanding	  of	  how	  Palestinians	  frame	  these	  issues,	  and	  what	  continues	  to	  shape	  their	  development,	  much	  more	  specific	  research	  will	  need	  to	  be	  conducted.	  	   Finally,	  the	  literature	  connecting	  frame	  analysis	  and	  frame	  development	  to	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peace	  studies	  is	  sparse.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  basic	  conflict	  analysis	  and	  resolution	  discourse	  seems	  to	  agree,	  that	  understanding	  how	  conflicting	  parties	  frame	  issues	  central	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  its	  resolution	  is	  helpful,	  if	  not	  essential.	  	  More	  theoretical	  work	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  it	  will	  expand	  the	  conflict	  resolution	  field	  and	  enable	  practitioners	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  as	  they	  design	  conflict	  interventions.	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Conclusion	  	   In	  the	  first	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  frame	  analysis	  offers	  a	  relatively	  optimistic	  lens	  for	  analyzing	  intractable	  conflicts.	  	  While	  the	  data	  that	  I	  collected	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  optimism	  and	  this	  conflict	  is,	  by	  any	  measure,	  likely	  to	  be	  far	  from	  resolution,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  reason	  for	  hope.	  	  Group	  frames	  are	  constantly	  changing	  as	  new	  information	  is	  introduced	  and	  spread	  throughout	  the	  group.	  	  Palestinians	  have	  not	  always	  been	  dynamically	  opposed	  to	  peace	  with	  Israel	  (Sahliyeh	  and	  Deng,	  2003),	  and	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  the	  conflict	  support	  for	  different	  resistance	  tactics	  and	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies	  have	  changed	  and	  adapted	  to	  the	  dominant	  perceptions	  of	  the	  times.	  	  It	  follows	  that	  as	  Palestinians	  are	  presented	  with	  further	  inputs,	  the	  way	  that	  they	  frame	  peace	  and	  violence	  will	  continue	  to	  shift.	  	   As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  majority	  of	  respondents	  generally,	  when	  not	  presented	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Palestine	  and	  Israel,	  frame	  peace	  positively	  in	  a	  way	  that	  involves	  an	  end	  to	  both	  direct	  and	  indirect	  violence.	  	  In	  other	  words	  respondents	  have	  a	  very	  strong	  understanding	  of	  what	  just	  peace	  requires.	  	  This	  provides	  a	  solid	  starting	  point	  for	  peacebuilding	  endeavors.	  	  Curle’s	  (1971)	  model	  for	  peacebuilding	  suggests	  that	  sustainable	  peace	  agreements	  are	  more	  likely	  when	  the	  people	  involved	  in	  them	  are	  well-­‐educated	  and	  informed	  about	  the	  conflict	  confront	  the	  issues.	  	  With	  70%	  of	  the	  participants	  exhibiting	  a	  positive	  view	  of	  peace	  that	  includes	  freedom,	  equality,	  human	  rights,	  and	  an	  end	  to	  acts	  of	  violence	  and	  aggression,	  the	  potential	  to	  reframe	  peace	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  conflict	  remains	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possible.	  	  If	  peacebuilding	  begins	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  true	  peace	  would	  satisfy	  these	  desires	  the	  idea	  of	  peace	  may	  become	  more	  desirable	  to	  Palestinians.	  	   However,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  note	  that	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinians	  frame	  peace	  and	  violence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  can	  still	  become	  more	  negative	  and	  antithetical.	  	  Every	  new	  settlement	  building,	  the	  persisting	  blockade	  of	  the	  Gaza	  ports,	  regulations	  that	  prevent	  true	  economic	  development,	  and	  restrictions	  on	  movement	  and	  access	  to	  holy	  sites,	  along	  with	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  oppressive	  structures	  all	  but	  destroy	  the	  hopes	  and	  desires	  that	  Palestinians	  carry	  for	  peace.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  is	  the	  growing	  sense	  of	  pessimism	  about	  the	  slightest	  mention	  of	  peace.	  	  The	  participants	  that	  made	  up	  the	  loss	  or	  concession	  frame	  group	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  peace	  with	  Israel	  is	  possible,	  found	  peace	  with	  Israel	  to	  be	  less	  desirable,	  and	  were	  much	  more	  supportive	  of	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	  Further,	  based	  on	  the	  literature,	  it	  can	  reasonably	  be	  predicted	  that	  this	  disposition	  towards	  peace	  will	  persist	  and	  spread	  unless	  significant	  progress	  is	  made	  on	  the	  conflict.	  Currently,	  it	  appears	  that	  aggressive	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies	  are	  most	  strongly	  supported.	  	  Given	  the	  growing	  pessimism	  of	  Palestinians	  and	  the	  widespread	  support	  for	  violent	  conflict	  engagement,	  a	  third	  Intifada	  seems	  very	  likely.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  next	  armed	  conflict	  will	  be	  more	  devastating	  than	  the	  past	  two	  and	  will	  not	  bring	  the	  parties	  any	  closer	  to	  peace.	  	  If	  there	  is	  to	  be	  an	  eventual	  resolution	  to	  this	  conflict,	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinians	  frame	  peace	  and	  support	  armed	  conflict	  engagement	  will	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  and	  dealt	  with	  in	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authentic	  ways.	  	  If	  Israel	  is	  interested	  in	  reaching	  a	  negotiated	  peace	  agreement	  they	  must	  show	  the	  Palestinian	  people	  that	  they	  are,	  in	  fact,	  a	  collaborative	  partner,	  and	  present	  the	  Palestinians	  with	  a	  nonviolent	  option	  through	  which	  to	  engage	  the	  conflict.	  Making	  any	  of	  the	  symbolic	  gestures	  mentioned	  above	  could	  help	  to	  curb	  the	  Palestinian	  notion	  that	  Israel	  is	  unwilling	  to	  act	  as	  a	  collaborative	  partner.	  	  If	  Israel	  is	  serious	  about	  reaching	  a	  negotiated	  solution	  with	  the	  Palestinians,	  then	  Israeli	  leaders	  should	  make	  several	  symbolic	  gestures	  independent	  of	  negotiation.	  	  There	  are	  several	  issues	  that	  Israel	  could	  address	  simply	  to	  move	  close	  to	  compliance	  with	  international	  norms.	  	  For	  example,	  Israel	  could	  allow	  Gazan	  fisherman	  to	  operate	  further	  than	  just	  a	  few	  miles	  off	  of	  the	  coast,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  Oslo	  Accords.	  	  Further,	  Israel	  could	  allow	  more	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  especially	  to	  religious	  sites.	  	  These	  two	  issues	  are	  among	  several	  that	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  negotiation.	  	  Similarly,	  Israel	  should	  halt	  its	  settlement	  program.	  	  Settlements	  themselves	  are	  symbolic	  because	  they	  represent	  unilateral	  decisions	  to	  build	  on	  land	  that	  was	  set	  aside	  for	  a	  negotiated	  solution.	  	  Continuing	  to	  build	  while	  asking	  for	  negotiations	  sends	  a	  message	  to	  the	  Palestinians	  that	  they	  are	  not	  truly	  willing	  to	  negotiate.	  The	  Palestinians	  also	  need	  to	  perceive	  a	  nonviolent	  way	  to	  engage	  the	  conflict.	  	  If	  the	  Palestinian	  perception	  is	  that	  nonviolent	  conflict	  engagement	  will	  not	  be	  acknowledged	  or	  beneficial,	  then	  the	  support	  for	  armed	  resistance	  will	  continue	  to	  rise.	  	  It	  is	  more	  than	  likely	  that	  the	  Palestinians,	  regardless	  of	  the	  military	  capabilities	  in	  Gaza,	  cannot	  defeat	  the	  Israeli	  army.	  	  But,	  they	  do	  have	  the	  capabilities	  to	  cause	  Israelis	  physical	  and	  psychological	  harm,	  and	  if	  these	  actions	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are	  the	  only	  perceived	  way	  to	  make	  progress	  towards	  a	  favorable	  end	  to	  the	  conflict	  they	  will	  surely	  be	  employed.	  	  Israeli	  leaders,	  especially	  those	  that	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  reaching	  a	  just	  peace	  agreement	  with	  the	  Palestinians,	  should	  engage	  Palestinian	  society	  on	  issues	  of	  peacebuilding.	  The	  international	  community	  should	  also	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  and	  reward	  different	  Palestinian	  nonviolent	  movements.	  	  One	  example	  of	  a	  nonviolent	  movement	  that	  has	  built	  momentum	  is	  the	  push	  to	  boycott	  Israeli	  goods	  that	  are	  made	  in	  settlements	  and	  companies	  that	  contribute	  to,	  or	  benefit	  from,	  settlement	  activity.14	  	  By	  supporting	  this	  initiative,	  the	  international	  community	  can	  put	  economic	  pressure	  on	  Israel	  to	  comply	  with	  international	  norms.	  	  Doing	  so	  is	  a	  vote	  in	  support	  of	  nonviolent	  conflict	  engagement.	  	  Naturally	  boycotting	  alone	  will	  not	  bring	  Israel	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table,	  but	  it	  is	  one	  very	  clear	  attempt	  by	  the	  Palestinians	  to	  nonviolently	  approach	  this	  conflict.	  	  If	  the	  international	  community	  is	  interested	  in	  supporting	  Palestinian	  nonviolent	  movement,	  it	  will	  consider	  joining	  this	  movement.	  	  Further,	  more	  information	  is	  needed	  about	  other	  nonviolent	  initiatives	  that	  are	  currently	  being	  implemented	  in	  Palestine.	  	  With	  more	  information,	  the	  international	  community	  can	  give	  more	  support	  to	  such	  initiatives.	  Most	  of	  the	  suggestions	  in	  this	  thesis	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  imperative	  for	  Israel	  to	  change	  many	  of	  its	  policy	  and	  interactions	  with	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  While	  Israeli	  policies	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Palestinians	  frame	  peace	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  Boycott,	  Divestment,	  and	  Sanction	  (BDS)	  movement	  is	  responsible	  for	  much	  of	  the	  progress	  that	  has	  been	  made	  on	  advancing	  such	  boycotts.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  BDS	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  a	  wholesale	  endorsement	  of	  the	  movement	  or	  its	  values.	  	  BDS	  is	  still	  forming	  and	  its	  positions	  on	  several	  issues	  are	  unclear	  to	  me	  and/or	  still	  developing.	  	  However,	  their	  work	  on	  how	  to	  put	  economic	  pressure	  on	  Israel’s	  settlement	  program	  is	  thorough	  and	  deserves	  attention.	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conflict	  engagement,	  they	  alone	  are	  not	  responsible.	  	  However,	  participants	  perceived	  Israel	  as	  primarily	  the	  cause	  of	  their	  support	  for	  violence	  and	  pessimism	  about	  peace	  with	  Israel.	  	  Further,	  as	  the	  stronger	  party	  and	  the	  occupying	  power,	  Israel	  must	  take	  responsibility	  for	  its	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  think	  about	  peace.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  not	  responsibility	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  side.	  	  Palestinian	  leaders	  can	  expose	  signs	  for	  hope	  in	  peace	  and	  can	  encourage	  new	  and	  innovative	  nonviolent	  conflict	  engagement	  strategies.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Palestinian	  decision	  to	  seek	  international	  recognition	  in	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  In	  November	  of	  2012,	  one	  year	  after	  being	  denied	  recognition	  of	  statehood	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  upgraded	  Palestine	  to	  the	  status	  of	  nonmember	  observer	  state.	  	  While	  this	  change	  in	  status	  is	  largely	  symbolic,	  the	  Palestinian	  decision	  to	  pursue	  it	  shows	  a	  willingness	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  leadership	  to	  expand	  on	  nonviolent	  political	  methods	  of	  engaging	  the	  conflict.	  	  With	  the	  status	  upgrade,	  Palestine	  now	  has	  access	  to	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  (ICC).	  	  The	  Palestinian	  leadership	  should	  make	  claims	  against	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  that	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  international	  norms.	  	  Successful	  claims	  will	  show	  Palestinians	  that	  their	  leaders	  are	  willing	  to	  engage	  the	  conflict	  and	  that	  the	  international	  community	  supports	  their	  cause.	  	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  progress	  towards	  resolution	  is	  necessary	  if	  this	  conflict	  is	  going	  to	  be	  spared	  another	  devastating	  escalation.	  	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  further	  militancy,	  there	  need	  to	  be	  significant	  and	  authentic	  steps	  towards	  collaboration	  on	  an	  eventual	  peace	  agreement.	  	  While	  the	  situation	  is	  desperate,	  and	  the	  data	  shows	  that	  respondents	  are	  jaded	  towards	  the	  idea	  with	  peace	  with	  Israel,	  there	  is	  hope	  for	  
	   83	  
the	  future	  if	  the	  will	  is	  there.	  	  As	  stated	  repetitively	  in	  this	  thesis,	  collective	  frames	  are	  constantly	  changing	  as	  new	  inputs	  are	  provided.	  	  If	  authentic	  and	  just	  peace	  is	  going	  to	  be	  established	  in	  this	  situation,	  Palestinians	  must	  be	  engaged	  on	  the	  issues	  that	  have	  influenced	  the	  negative	  framing	  of	  peace.	  	  While	  this	  will	  not	  be	  easy,	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  if	  the	  goal	  is	  true	  and	  just	  peace.	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APPENDIX	  A	  
THE	  SURVEY	  
Opinions	  of	  Palestinian	  University	  Students	  on	  the	  Prospects	  for	  Peace	  with	  
Israel	  
	  
Gender	  (select	  one):	  
	  
	   Male	   	   	   Female	  
	  
University	  Enrolled	  in:	   	   	   	   Discipline:	  
	  
Year	  of	  Study:	   	   	   	   	   Political	  Affiliation(s)	  
(optional):	  	  
Age:	  
Residence:	  	  City	   	   Village	   	   Camp	  
	  
Part	  I	  1)	  Please	  select	  your	  religious	  orientation:	  	   ___	  Muslim	  	   ___	  Christian	  	   ___	  Nonreligious	  (secular)	  	   ___	  Other___________________________	  	  2)	  On	  average	  how	  often	  do	  you	  attend	  religious	  services?	  	   ___	  Less	  than	  once	  a	  month	  	   ___	  1-­‐3	  times	  each	  month	  	   ___	  Once	  a	  week	  	   ___	  More	  than	  once	  a	  week	  	   ___	  Daily	  	  3)	  How	  often	  do	  you	  read	  your	  religion’s	  Holy	  Book?	  	   ___	  Less	  than	  once	  a	  month	  	   ___	  1-­‐3	  times	  each	  month	  	   ___	  Once	  a	  week	  	   ___	  More	  than	  once	  a	  week	  	   ___	  Daily	  	  4)	  To	  you,	  how	  desirable	  is	  the	  adoption	  of	  Shari’a	  law	  by	  the	  Palestinians?	  	   ___	  Very	  Desirable	  	   ___	  Moderately	  Desirable	  	   ___	  Moderately	  Undesirable	  	   ___	  Very	  Undesirable	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5)	  In	  your	  opinion,	  which	  of	  the	  following	  should	  be	  the	  top	  priority	  for	  the	  Palestinians?	  (Rank	  1-­‐6)	  	   ___	  End	  of	  occupation	  	   ___	  Internal	  governmental	  reform	  	   ___	  Reunification	  between	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  and	  West	  Bank	  	   ___	  Economic	  development	  and	  growth	  	   ___	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  reconciliation	  	   ___	  Increasing	  the	  influence	  of	  religion	  in	  society	  and	  national	  law	  	   ___	  Other	  _______________________________________________	  	  6)	  In	  a	  few	  sentences	  (1-­‐3),	  please	  write,	  in	  your	  own	  words,	  your	  own	  definition	  of	  peace.	  	  	   	  	  	  7)	  Based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  peace	  that	  you	  described,	  how	  likely	  is	  peace	  with	  Israel?	  	   ___	  Very	  likely	  	   ___	  Likely	  	   ___	  Unlikely	  	   ___	  Very	  unlikely	  	   ___	  Impossible	  	  8)	  Based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  peace	  that	  you	  described,	  how	  desirable	  is	  peace	  with	  Israel?	  	   ___	  Very	  desirable	  	   ___	  Moderately	  desirable	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Moderately	  undesirable	  	   ___	  Very	  undesirable	  	  9)	  In	  a	  few	  sentences	  (1-­‐3),	  please	  write,	  in	  your	  own	  words,	  your	  own	  definition	  of	  reconciliation.	  	  	  	  	  	  10)	  Based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  reconciliation	  that	  you	  described,	  how	  likely	  is	  reconciliation	  with	  Israel?	  	   ___	  Very	  likely	  	   ___	  Likely	  	   ___	  Unlikely	  	   ___	  Very	  unlikely	  	   ___	  Impossible	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11)	  Based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  reconciliation	  that	  you	  described,	  how	  desirable	  is	  reconciliation	  with	  Israel?	  	   ___	  Very	  Desirable	  	   ___	  Moderately	  Desirable	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Moderately	  Undesirable	  	   ___	  Very	  Undesirable	  	  12)	  What	  do	  you	  desire	  for	  a	  final	  agreement	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians?	  	   ___	  Two-­‐states	  with	  full	  reconciliation	  with	  Israel	  	   ___	  Two-­‐states	  with	  no	  reconciliation	  with	  Israel	  	   ___	  One	  state	  with	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  together	  	   ___	  Other	  __________________________________	  	  13)	  How	  likely	  do	  you	  believe	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  based	  entirely	  on	  the	  1967	  borders	  with	  East	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  Palestinian	  capital	  is?	  	   ___	  Very	  Likely	  	   ___	  Likely	  	   ___	  Unlikely	  	   ___	  Very	  Unlikely	  	   ___	  Impossible	  	  14)	  To	  you,	  how	  desirable	  is	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  based	  entirely	  on	  the	  1967	  borders	  with	  East	  Jerusalem	  as	  the	  Palestinian	  capital?	  	   ___	  Very	  Desirable	  	   ___	  Moderately	  Desirable	  	   ___	  Moderately	  Undesirable	  	   ___	  Very	  Undesirable	  	  15)	  In	  your	  opinion,	  what	  is	  the	  biggest	  hindrance	  to	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution?	  (Rank	  1-­‐	  4)	  	   ___	  Settlements	  	   ___	  Refugees	  	   ___	  Jerusalem	  	   ___	  Economic	  dependence	  	   ___	  Other	  _______________________	  	  16)	  How	  would	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  affect	  relations	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians?	  	   ___	  Much	  more	  peaceful	  	   ___	  More	  peaceful	  	   ___	  No	  change	  	   ___	  Less	  peaceful	  	   ___	  Much	  less	  peaceful	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Part	  II:	  Please	  indicate	  how	  strongly	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statements.	  	  1)	  Struggle	  should	  only	  be	  used	  for	  defensive	  purposes	  such	  as	  self-­‐defense	  or	  retaliation.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  2)	  Struggle	  should	  be	  a	  major	  strategy	  of	  a	  resistance	  movement.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  3)	  Struggle	  should	  be	  used	  when	  nonviolent	  movements	  have	  not	  been	  successful.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  4)	  Struggle	  should	  be	  the	  last	  resort	  of	  a	  resistance	  movement.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  5)	  Struggle	  should	  never	  be	  used.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  6)	  The	  Palestinian	  leadership	  should	  support	  militant	  action	  against	  Israelis.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	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7)	  If	  the	  goal	  of	  a	  resistance	  movement	  is	  peace,	  violent	  tactics	  should	  be	  included	  in	  its	  strategy.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  8)	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  enemies	  to	  make	  peace	  without	  violence.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  9)	  Violent	  action	  should	  be	  used	  against	  Israeli	  soldiers.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  10)	  Violent	  action	  should	  be	  used	  against	  Israelis	  on	  land	  occupied	  since	  1967.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  11)	  Violent	  action	  should	  be	  used	  against	  all	  Israelis.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  12)	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  to	  live	  together	  peacefully.	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Agree	  	   ___	  Agree	  	   ___	  Neutral	  	   ___	  Disagree	  	   ___	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  *Struggle	  in	  the	  Arabic	  version	  encompasses	  violence	  and	  armed	  resistance.	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APPENDIX	  B	  
	  
GROUP	  INTERVIEW	  SCRIPT	  	  
Discussion	  Questions	  
	  
A	  Note	  to	  Participants:	  We	  wish	  to	  protect	  the	  identity	  of	  all	  participants	  in	  this	  
study.	  We	  ask	  that	  anything	  that	  is	  shared	  in	  this	  discussion	  not	  be	  shared	  
afterward.	  We	  will	  take	  notes	  on	  the	  discussion,	  but	  will	  not	  record	  names.	  No	  
comments	  will	  be	  attributed	  to	  any	  individual.	  	  
1) Please	  discuss	  your	  definition	  of	  Peace:	  	  
2) How	  likely	  is	  peace	  with	  Israel?	  (Is	  there	  general	  optimism	  or	  pessimism)	  	  
3) How	  desirable	  is	  peace	  with	  Israel?	  	  
4) What	  is	  the	  biggest	  hindrance	  to	  peace	  with	  Israel?	  (Settlements,	  Jerusalem,	  Refugees,	  Internal	  strife,	  Economic	  independence,	  etc.)	  	  
5) If	  these	  conditions	  were	  met,	  how	  would	  your	  opinion	  change?	  (In	  other	  words,	  what	  does	  peace	  with	  Israel	  require?)	  	  	  
6) Describe	  what	  methods	  of	  action	  should	  be,	  or	  are	  being,	  utilized	  in	  engaging	  the	  conflict	  (violent	  and	  nonviolent	  options):	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When	  does	  something	  become	  violent?	  Nonlethal?	  Retaliation?	  Self-­‐Defense?	  	  	  
7) Do	  you	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians	  to	  share	  the	  land?	  Please	  explain.	  Is	  this	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accomplished	  with	  two	  states	  or	  one?	  	  
8) How	  will	  this	  conflict	  end?	  	  
9) Can	  nonviolent	  action	  be	  successful	  in	  this	  context?	  	  
10) Please	  tell	  us	  anything	  else	  that	  we	  should	  know	  about	  your	  views	  of	  peace	  and	  violence	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  this	  conflict.	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